Name:		Centre Number/Index Number:		Class:	

DUNMAN HIGH SCHOOL
Preliminary Examinations
Year 6

H2 HISTORY

9174 / 01

17 September 2025

Paper 1 The Changing International Order (1945 – 2000)

3 hours

Additional Materials: Answer Booklet

READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST

Write your Centre number, index number and name on all the work you hand in.
Write in dark blue or black pen on both sides of the paper.
Do not use staples, paper clips, highlighters, glue or correction fluid.

Section A
Answer **Question 1**.

Section B
Answer **two** questions.

At the end of the examination, fasten your work securely together.
The number of marks is given in brackets [ ] at the end of each question or part question.

Section A

You must answer **all** questions from this section.

DISSOLUTION OF THE SOVIET UNION

1. Read the sources and then answer the question which follows.

Source A

Reagan's determination to ruin the Soviet economy and destroy communism and the Soviet Union was a hallmark of his eight-year presidency, carried out through a harsh nuclear policy toward Moscow that softened only slightly when Gorbachev came to office.

Reagan's agenda toward Moscow started shortly after his first term and marked a major departure from the mild détente of the Carter period. In 1981, Reagan backed his rhetoric with a trillion-dollar defense buildup. Even though his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) never led to deployment of an actual missile shield, it drew the Soviets into a costly effort to mount a response. Reagan's 'Star Wars' was very successful blackmail. The Soviet Union tried to keep pace with the US military buildup, but their economy couldn't endure such competition.

The deployment of more advanced US missiles in Europe rattled the Kremlin's nerves because of the shorter time they needed to reach Soviet targets compared with intercontinental missiles. The arms race drained Soviet coffers and created unsustainable economic pressure that triggered the economic difficulties speeding up the Soviet collapse in 1991.

From an interview by an American news network with Gennady Gerasimov, a former Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman (1980s), June 2004.

Source B

In 1981, President Reagan was determined to reverse the trend of American and western weakness that had developed in the late 1970s. For the decade of the 1970s, the Soviets invested about 50% more in their forces than we did. When Reagan took office, the US was investing only 65 cents for every dollar's worth of Soviet military investment. Our urgent need was to regain sufficient military strength to persuade the Soviets that we would allow them no significant exploitable military advantage against our vital interests.

Our policy was to rebuild US military capability and send an unmistakable signal that we would resist Soviet expansion in all its forms. The SDI and our sustained military modernisation were controversial, but we believed they would expose the impossibility of the Soviets' keeping pace both economically and technologically. In internal discussions, we often remarked that while it might not be the intention, the very act of demonstrating

America's economic and technological superiority created pressure on the Soviet leadership.

The goal was deterrence and stability. But in hindsight, it was clear our policy contributed to the internal crisis and collapse the Soviets experienced.

From the memoirs of Caspar Weinberger
(Reagan's Secretary of Defense, 1981–1987), 1990.

Source C

The Soviet economy faces unprecedented structural problems that cannot be resolved within the existing system. Gross National Product (GNP) growth has fallen from an average of 6% annually in the 1950s to barely 2% by 1987. Military spending now consumes an estimated 15–17% of GNP - more than twice the comparable Western burden - creating an unsustainable drain on resources. Productivity in agriculture has stagnated despite massive investment. In manufacturing, steel output declined by 8% over the last decade. The technology gap with the West continues to widen: Soviet microelectronics production remains less than 1% of global capacity, forcing reliance on outdated mainframe computers. Consumer goods remain scarce, with fewer than one in ten families enjoying regular automobile use.

Without fundamental reform, the system faces potential collapse within the next decade. However, any serious market-oriented reform threatens the Communist Party's monopoly on power, creating an impossible dilemma for the leadership.

CIA intelligence assessment of Soviet economic prospects,
November 1988.

**Gross national product (GNP) is the total value of all the final goods and services made by a nation's economy.*

Source D



A German cartoon entitled,
'Ice-breaker Gorbachev', 1988.

Source E

The August coup was the final blow to an already weakened system. My reforms had unleashed forces I could not control. Glasnost gave voice to nationalist movements I had underestimated. Perestroika split the Communist Party between hardliners and reformers. The economic situation deteriorated despite our best efforts. By 1991, I was trying to hold together a country that was pulling apart at the seams. The coup plotters thought they were saving the Soviet Union, but they delivered the final blow. Yeltsin exploited the situation brilliantly, positioning himself as the defender of democracy while systematically undermining the Union. The irony is that American pressure was not the decisive factor - we destroyed ourselves through our own internal contradictions.

Extract from Mikhail Gorbachev's autobiography, 1996.

Source F

The Soviet Union passed into history not because of any conspiracy of the West and not only because of the structural defects of the communist system, but also because of decisions taken and not taken at the time of the crisis. Both superpowers made crucial mistakes that accelerated uncontrolled collapse rather than managed transition.

Gorbachev's fatal miscalculation was persisting in the illusion that the system could be preserved without complete reform while believing in its superiority. The belief that disintegration is 'unthinkable' could tempt policy-makers to embrace anti-system policies for short-term advantage, believing that 'nothing really bad can happen' in the long term.

As late as 1990, Pentagon experts believed Soviet total breakdown is unlikely and expected gradual decline over decades, not sudden collapse. The Marshall Plan, conceived as defensive, proved indistinguishable to the Kremlin from offensive economic warfare. Americans failed to anticipate that defensive pressure would trigger Soviet overreactions accelerating disintegration rather than forcing gradual adaptation.

From a publication by a European research institute, 2012.

Now answer the following questions.

a) Compare and contrast the evidence in Sources A and B regarding the views about Reagan's military policy. [10]

b) How far do Sources A-F support the view that the collapse of the Soviet Union by 1991 was caused by internal problems? [30]

Section B

You must answer **two** questions from this section.

EITHER

2. How far were the problems experienced by the international economy in the 1970s and 1980s due to its over-dependence on the American economy? [30]

OR

3. 'Japan's remarkable economic growth after 1945 was primarily a consequence of favourable domestic policies and practices.' How far do you agree? [30]

AND EITHER

4. How significant was superpower involvement in shaping the development of the Arab-Israeli conflict between 1948 and 1979? [30]

OR

5. To what extent did economic interests drive the Congo Crisis of 1960-1965? [30]

END OF PAPER