



1(a) Compare and contrast the evidence provided in Sources A and B on the reasons for Myanmar's membership into ASEAN in 1997. [10]

Similarities

Sources A and B are similar in showing that Myanmar's admission into ASEAN would help to foster regional cooperation and contribute to regional security.

- Source A – 'Myanmar's admission to ASEAN marks a new chapter in regional harmony.'
- Source B – 'Politically, it is better to bring them into the tent than leave them out where instability festers.'

Insights to similarities – Using common action CK

By the 1990s, prevailing geopolitical and institutional context made it strategically important for Myanmar to join ASEAN. The end of the Cold War meant that there was little need to maintain the ideological blocs, meaning that Myanmar's admission would be less likely to undermine current members' interest. Furthermore, given the issues arising from the junta's government against Aung San Suu Kyi, both ASEAN and Myanmar viewed that it was important for Myanmar not to be politically isolated. For ASEAN, Myanmar's admission would allow it to continuously engage Myanmar over the issue to create opportunities for resolution, thereby helping to bring political stability. For Myanmar, its admission would minimise the political isolation that could help the junta government maintain legitimacy.

Differences

Source A and B differ on the nature of the reasons for Myanmar's membership into ASEAN in 1997.

- **Source A** – 'Our aspiration is to contribute to ASEAN's goal of unity through peaceful coexistence and mutual respect.' → highlighting that the goals are idealistic and for Myanmar to move towards more normative goals that are in alignment to regional goals.
- **Source B** – Myanmar's admission 'is a pragmatic step: economically, Myanmar is rich in resources and offers untapped potential for trade and connectivity.'

Insights to differences – Using author's purpose

- **Source A** – Myanmar being a new member joining is likely to want to gain legitimacy by assuring ASEAN of its peaceful intentions to show a rhetorical alignment with ASEAN values. This was important in view of its reputation being under fire as a result of its oppressive response against protests the junta government and placing Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest despite being voted into government. Furthermore, given that this was a key priority for Myanmar and economically Myanmar was unlikely to make significant contributions to regional economic cooperation, it would help to explain why Source A focused more on its contributions to the larger prevailing ASEAN goals.
- **Source B** – Malaysian PM who was addressing the international community who at the time condemned ASEAN for admitting Myanmar into the regional organisation because of its actions were viewed negatively and Mahathir, who had strongly advocated and led the organisation in its engagement of Myanmar was trying to justify ASEAN's actions. Therefore explaining why the source emphasised the pragmatic benefits to convince both its members and western critics for admitting Myanmar into ASEAN.

1(b) How far do Sources A – F support the view that the expansion of ASEAN's membership in the 1990s undermined ASEAN's strength as a regional organisation? [30]

Sources C, D, E and F support the assertion showing that the expansion of ASEAN's membership in the 1990s undermined ASEAN's strength in terms of weakening its unity and affecting its credibility as a regional organisation. Sources A, B and to some C and F challenges the assertion, showing how the expansion of membership helped to enhance its regional legitimacy and create to potential to further regional cooperation. In view of the above, the support sources are preferred.

Sources C, D, E and F support the assertion showing how the expansion of ASEAN's membership in the 1990s had indeed undermined ASEAN's strength in terms of weakening its efforts at regional cooperation because of greater diversity of views and undermining its credibility in managing regional conflicts. Source C helps to establish the ways in which ASEAN's strength was undermined as seen when 'it struggled to respond to human rights concerns in Myanmar' and the enlargement also meant that 'consensus was harder to achieve.' This meant that the enlargement came 'at the cost of decisiveness and diplomatic leverage.' Source F reiterates one of the issues where 'enlargement complicated the consensus model' with the 'developmental and governance disparities between original and newer members [making it] difficult to align on key issues like democracy', highlighting the institutional limits of ASEAN that was highlighted because of greater diversity of political views. Further explanation of how ASEAN's increase meant greater divergences in interests is seen in Source E which shows how the expansion of its membership worsened regional cooperation because of the need to accommodate greater 'divergences of national interests'. This was seen with the example of how Cambodia repeatedly blocked the 'joint communiques critical of Chinese actions' in the South China Sea dispute which showed how the 'external powers exploit the internal cleavages.' Source E further elaborates by noting that ASEAN's principle of non-interference became a source of the organisation's ineffectiveness in responding to the humanitarian issues taking place in Myanmar and Cambodia. An example of ASEAN's inability to deal with the humanitarian issues taking place in Myanmar is seen with Source D that shows a woman, representing ASEAN, who is being urinated on by a baby, representing Myanmar. The diaper box with the label 'Bloody Crackdown Baby Dry Diapers' is referring to the violent military suppression of dissent in Myanmar taking place in the 1990s. The cartoon shows the woman trying to take responsibility for Myanmar but ASEAN is being dirtied in doing so. Hence the cartoon suggest that Myanmar is a disruptive, violent child that ASEAN struggles to discipline or manage, and ASEAN's attempt to "take care of it" damages ASEAN's own image and credibility.

The point made by the support sources are reliable when considering the prevailing context of the time. The reliability of Source C may be called to question given how the FEER was often critical of authoritarian regime and therefore less sympathetic to ASEAN and hence may focus disproportionately on ASEAN's shortcomings. Yet the issues put forth in Source C were based on issues with the consensus model i.e. the ASEAN Way seen in Sources C, F and E was most evident following Vietnam's admission in 1995. Vietnam wanted pushed for ASEAN to take a more assertive position against China on the South China Sea dispute to prevent further Chinese expansion in the South China Seas. However, the diverging interests seen in how Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia being reluctant to antagonise China led ASEAN to only issue 'serious concern' but did not name China nor directly condemn China's action. This meant that ASEAN could not exert significant pressure on China thereby undermining ASEAN's strength as an organisation. The reliability of Source D may also be called to question as the Burmese exiles who are hostile to the junta government were likely to be sceptical of ASEAN's engagement policy with Myanmar. However the point made by the source is reliable given how ASEAN received extensive western criticism for its inclusion of Myanmar into ASEAN in 1997. The inclusion effectively meant that ASEAN was legitimising a brutal military government and there was also little intervention to address Myanmar's human rights abuses such as violent killings of popular movements, arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi and continued removal of freedoms of people in Myanmar. This was worsened by

the fact that in spite of many years of engagement with Myanmar following the 1988 repression of protests against SLORC, little inroads were seen in influencing the political developments in Myanmar. Thus, discrediting ASEAN's reputation as losing credibility and being ineffective in tackling regional issues.

Sources A, B and to some extent C and F challenges the assertion, showing how the expansion of membership helped to enhance its regional legitimacy and create to potential to further regional cooperation. Source A and B both show the benefit to including Myanmar in ASEAN. Source A emphasises on the positive outcomes such as fostering 'regional harmony' and in helping to 'strengthen the bonds of Southeast Asia and foster shared prosperity.' Source B asserts that Myanmar's admission would benefit ASEAN by increasing economic cooperation, and in providing opportunities to engage Myanmar which would contribute to regional stability. Source C mentions that potential for ASEAN to help 'moderate [the new members'] behaviour and align them with regional norms.' Showing how it could help to engage regional neighbours over concerning issues and help to ensure greater regional stability. Source F further elaborates showing that the expansion of ASEAN helped to give the organisation greater legitimacy and more opportunities for 'more inclusive dialogue on shared challenges', showing how it has strengthened ASEAN. Hence showing how it provided greater regional identity and avenues for cooperation.

The challenge sources put forth a less convincing argument. Source A and B, being public remarks about Myanmar joining ASEAN having positive impacts in fostering regional cooperation and in benefiting the regional economically and politically, would have been likely exaggerated the benefits to justify its admission given that ASEAN was under fire for agreeing the Myanmar's admission which implied tacit support for Myanmar and the junta's government's breaches in human rights. Source A would have wanted to emphasise the benefits to assure the sceptical ASEAN states of benefits of its membership. Its entrance in the organisation was important in helping to minimise its political isolation and to as a means to deter political pressure given prevailing institutional norms of non-interference. Source B also showed Mahathir, who had been an advocate for engagement with Myanmar sought to defend ASEAN by framing it as pragmatic and beneficial for the region. The assertion made by A and B are weakened coupled by the fact that these were in the early stages of Myanmar's admission and further intensified criticisms of ASEAN which were seen in the support sources show that the benefits were at best rhetorical. The point made by Source F in pointing out that it helped to give ASEAN more geopolitical legitimacy is valid given that the inclusion of Myanmar, Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos enabled it to be an organisation that represented regional interests and opinion. However, this served as potential benefit the region but Source F shows that these benefits were not enjoyed and with the ASEAN way being a form on hindrance, showing how the expansion hindered efforts to put forth a collective response against critical issues concerning the region.

In conclusion, the support sources note how the expansion of ASEAN's membership in the 1990s had indeed undermined ASEAN's strength in terms of weakening its efforts at regional cooperation because of greater diversity of views and undermining its credibility in managing regional conflicts. The sources present a more compelling perspective given the inability by ASEAN to grapple with increasingly divergent views on regional conflicts such as the South China Sea had limited ASEAN's ability to respond to regional issues due to its principle of non-interference. The challenge sources present a less convincing argument showing how ASEAN was not undermined especially considering that it helped to foster regional identity and cooperation when cross-referenced to the support sources that show the challenges ASEAN faced. As such, the support sources are preferred.



2. 'The superpowers had the greatest influence in shaping the different forms of government in Southeast Asian states after independence.' How far do you agree with this statement? [30]

Possible Arguments

1. The prevailing Cold War competition led both the US and USSR to provide political and economic support to authoritarian forms of government as a means of establish allies in the region.

- **SE1:** In South Vietnam, the United States engineered and sustained Ngo Dinh Diem's authoritarian presidency (1955–63). The US opposed nationwide elections promised under the Geneva Accords (1956) and endorsed Diem's one-party dominance, reasoning that democracy could allow communist victory. This entrenched dictatorship as the form of government.
- **SE2:** The USSR provided material support, military aid and even radio propaganda to support North Vietnamese communist regime in a show of ideological solidarity with their fellow communist ally. Between 1965 and 1975, the USSR provided an estimated \$7–8 billion worth of military and economic aid to North Vietnam.
- **SE3:** In the case of Thailand, the fear of Thailand falling to communism given that the country was most proximate to the battlegrounds of the Second Indochina War led the US to provide the Sarit regime with \$45million in economic aid and \$75 million in military aid by 1969, helping Sarit to further entrench military rule in Thailand.

2. The US, in seeking to prevent the communist expansion in Southeast Asia, actively sought to ensure the establishment of democratic forms of governments especially in the initial post-independence period.

- **SE1:** In the Philippines, the US retained colonial-era democratic institutions (presidential system, bicameral legislature). Even while US aid propped up elites against the Huk rebellion in 1946, Washington's model ensured continuity of a democratic form of government (though dominated by oligarchs).
- **SE2:** In Burma, despite neutrality, US recognition and limited aid allowed U Nu to maintain a parliamentary democracy into the early 1960s. Superpower support of independence gave breathing room to experiment democratically before the 1962 coup.

3. However, it was ultimately the role of the political leaders who played a greater role in influencing the different forms of government given that the leaders made active decisions to pursue a particular form of government.

- **SE1:** Sukarno shift from parliamentary democracy to Guided Democracy (shift to a more authoritarian form of government) in 1957 was not because of direct superpower imposition, but due to an intentional decision to consolidate power to deal with the internal instability such as regional rebellions and weak coalitions. While Soviets and Chinese support legitimised his later left-leaning policies, the move was primarily driven by his personal leadership and desire to balance the army, Islamists, and communists.

- **SE2:** Philippine political elites actively wanted democracy, not simply as an American imposition, but as a political system best suited to maintaining their power and privilege. While the United States introduced the institutions and ideology of liberal democracy during colonisation, Philippine elites embraced and adapted democratic frameworks strategically to entrench their own family dominance and secure legitimacy. This was seen in how Ramon Magsaysay won the 1953 elections due to skillful political maneuvering to gain political backing from powerful political families and traditional parties. His ability to tackle the Hukbalahap rebellion had also allowed him to gain greater legitimacy. Hence while there was American support for liberal democratic government, the ability to sustain the support depended on the political elites.
- **SE3:** In the case of Sarit, the American support from economic and military support helped Sarit to further entrench the military. In 1958–1963, the US poured nearly \$650 million in military and economic aid into Thailand. This was one of the highest per-capita aid flows in Asia at the time. US aid was used to fund infrastructural projects such as building highways, dams and rural development schemes. This helped Sarit to gain credibility and legitimacy, helping to entrench military rule.

4. The changes in the different forms of governments in Southeast Asia can also be explained by the role that the masses had in exerting pressures on political elites to pursue a particular form of government.

- **SE1:** U Nu's decision to introduce Buddhism as the state religion in 1961 triggered protests across from various groups such as minority groups and students in Rangoon. This negative response from the masses convinced the Tatmadaw to intervene on 2 March 1962, as a result of the need to exert greater control to ensure stability in Burma. Hence resulting in the introduction of the military authoritarian government in Burma.
- **SE2:** The People Power protests in Philippines in 1986 is another example of how mass political participation led to the rise of different forms of governments. Two million Filipinos rallied behind Aquino due to Marcos' refusal to step down after the 1986 elections. Eventually, the people succeeded in undermining Marcos' corrupt and repressive regime, paving the way for a Democratic Governance under Aquino.

3. Assess the view that multiculturalism was the most suitable approach to foster national unity in independent Southeast Asia. [30]

Possible Arguments

- 1. Multiculturalism tended to be more suitable for Southeast Asian states that lacked a dominant culture, helping to address the challenges of a culturally diverse society that lacked traditional ethnic 'roots' through the creation of new civic identities as a means of resolving contentions through compromise and conciliation.**
 - **Context:** For some countries like Singapore and Malaysia that did not have a majority group, multiculturalism was well-suited in helping to foster a national identity the sought to preserve the cultures and identities of the various communities in its respective societies.
 - **SE1:** The Alliance coalition institutionalised a model balancing Malay political dominance with Chinese economic rights and Indian representation. The 1957 Constitution guaranteed Malay "special position" but also citizenship for non-Malays, reflecting a compromise between communities. This avoided mass alienation at independence.
 - **SE2:** In Singapore, Article 153A of the constitution proclaims Malay, Mandarin, Tamil and English to be the four official languages in Singapore, in recognition of the multi-racial, multi-religious and multi-lingual composition of Singapore society. The preservation of the various culture and languages helped the various ethnic groups to identify with the national identity, helping to foster national unity.
- 2. The increasing incorporation of multiculturalism by some countries that adopted a more assimilative approach in response to growing separatist movements to sustain their national unity efforts, shows the suitability of multiculturalism in fostering national unity.**
 - **SE1:** While strongly assimilationist in general, some recognition of Islamic traditions in Patani was necessary to prevent rebellion in the Muslim-majority south. Accommodation of cultural rights tempered separatist sentiment. By the 1950s–60s, the Thai government allowed limited accommodation of Muslim traditions in the south. Muslim religious schools (pondok, later madrasahs) were tolerated, though monitored. Patani Muslims were recruited into the civil service, army, and police to reduce feelings of exclusion.
 - **SE2:** While Sukarno and Suharto promoted Bahasa Indonesia and *Pancasila* to assimilate, they also allowed cultural recognition to prevent alienation. Major religious groups (Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism, Buddhism) were all officially recognised as state religions under *Pancasila*.
- 3. Multiculturalism sometimes exacerbated divisions within some Southeast Asian societies showing how it was not always suitable in fostering national unity.**
 - **SE1:** In Malaysia, the multicultural bargain broke down with the May 13 racial riots, when perceived Chinese economic dominance and Malay marginalisation erupted in violence. It highlighted the growing ethnic unhappiness particularly from the ethnic Malays who demanded for affirmative action. This led to the New Economic Policy (1971), shifting Malaysia toward a pro-Malay assimilationist framework.
 - **SE2:** In Burma, the 1947 constitution attempted to ensure tangible national unity among the indigenous ethnic groups by stating that Burma would be a "Union" in which ethnic groups would enjoy full autonomy in internal administration and the right to maintain their culture, language, and traditions. This created expectations of equal treatment of the diverse ethnic groups in Burma. In the 1950s, the Burmese government promoted Burmese – the language of the ethnic Burman majority – as the language that one had to use in school and in the

arenas of authority while relegating minority languages to informal communication. This threat to minority identity drove minority groups like the Karens to form movements like the Karen National Union to create their own government that would instead safeguard their identity further hindering efforts at fostering national unity in Burma.

4. Furthermore, for Southeast Asian governments with a dominant group, the need to ensure and safeguard national unity quickly and appeal to the majority meant that multiculturalism seemed less suitable given the challenges to foster national unity in a short period, hence turning to more assimilative approaches to foster national unity.

- **SE1:** Similarly, in Burma, Prime Minister U Nu's initial federalist recognition of ethnic minorities (e.g., Shan, Kachin, Karen) encouraged separatist sentiment, weakening parliamentary democracy. When Ne Win seized power in 1962, he imposed the Burmese Way to Socialism, privileging Burman culture and Buddhism as unifying pillars. Though authoritarian, this assimilationist model stabilised the ethnic challenges. While it excluded minorities, it gave the majority a sense of common national identity.
- **SE2:** From the 1930s, Thai leaders such as Phibun Songkhram pushed policies of Thaification, emphasising Thai language, Buddhist traditions, and loyalty to the monarchy. Minority groups (Chinese, Lao, hill tribes, and Malay Muslims) were pressured to assimilate into a singular Thai identity. For instance, Chinese schools were restricted, and Chinese surnames had to be changed to Thai. Compared to a multicultural model, assimilation gave Thailand a clear national identity that withstood political challenges and military coups.

4. To what extent was economic change in independent Southeast Asia due more to external developments rather than domestic factors? [30]

Possible Arguments

1. External developments such as the Cold War helped to bring about economic change through the provision of economic aid that helped to foster the expansion of the agricultural and industrial sector.

- **Context:** This was particularly seen in the example of American economic aid to the region. The prevailing Cold War developments in the region heightened tensions which led to the need to provide economic aid to strengthen ties and limit the appeal of communists.
- **SE1:** Thailand, being at the frontline of growing communist presence in Indochina established a close political relationship with USA. In allowing the US to establish military bases, Thailand benefitted from American expenditure in Thailand which amounted to nearly \$3.5 billion. In addition, Thailand received over US\$650 million in US economic and military aid (1950–1975). US support built major infrastructure such as Friendship Highway (opened 1957) linked Bangkok to the Northeast, enabling agricultural commercialization, and US-funded dams and irrigation projects boosted rice production.
- **SE2:** The Philippines, being one of the USA's key allies in the region also received extensive aid. In the 1950s, it received over US\$500 million in US economic aid, supporting post-war reconstruction. In the 1960s–70s, the US and Japan provided loans and investments in infrastructure and export-processing industries (electronics, garments). This contributed to helping the Philippines develop its export industries.

2. Investments and global demand for Southeast Asian exports also helped to develop Southeast Asia's export markets, helping to facilitate the expansion and modernisation of agricultural and industrial sector.

- **Context:** With the waning US presence following the end of the Vietnam War, its position was soon overtaken by the Japanese who were looking for potential trade partners who could supply key raw materials. It was also looking for markets for its manufacturing goods. Given the geographical proximity, it saw Southeast Asia was seen as an attractive region for Japan.
- **SE1:** In Malaysia, Japanese and Western firms like Intel (1972), AMD (1972), Hitachi, and Hewlett-Packard set up semiconductor and electronics assembly plants in Penang. By 1980, electronics had become Malaysia's second-largest export sector, overtaking tin and catching up with rubber. By 1990, electronics and electrical machinery made up 31% of total exports, compared to just 7% in 1970. This marked Malaysia's structural shift towards export-oriented industrialisation, reducing dependence on volatile commodity markets and embedding the country into global production networks.
- **SE2:** Japanese firms also invested in the region's textile industry totalling approximately US\$505million by the end of 1977. The Japanese also invested heavily in iron and non-ferrous metals totalling around US\$206 million by end of 1977. This helped to support the economic development of the region's industries.

3. The role of the government played an important role in ensuring economic changes through its state planning and efforts to intervene in economic development that helped to facilitate economic change.

- **SE1:** Under Suharto, the five-year Repelita plans helped to steer the economy towards industrialisation. Repelita IV prioritised industrial growth over agricultural growth by targeting 9.5% growth rate for industry and 3% growth rate for the agricultural sector.

- **SE2:** The Economic Development Board (1961) targeted multinational corporations with incentives, while Jurong Industrial Estate (1962) created an industrial base. The state also invested in housing through the HDB (1960) and disciplined labour markets through the National Wages Council (1972). This strong state direction made Singapore attractive for foreign investors—including Japanese—but the foundation was domestic institution-building.
 - **SE3:** Under the Philippines, to deal with the issue of rice shortages, Marcos took interest in researching for new strains of rice. This resulted in the establishment of the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) that sought to develop high-yielding rice. While funding came from oil companies, the IRRI eventually came up with IR-8, a high-yielding rice. Under Marcos, a coordinating council aim to help provide supply of seeds, chemicals, loans and machinery helped to develop the production of rice in the Philippines. By the late 1970s, Philippines was able to achieve a fair degree of self-sufficiency in rice production because of heavy government intervention.
- 4. The role that the private businesses played was also critical in helping to helping to sustain economic changes through provision of capital, entrepreneurship, resources and business networks to support the various economic sectors.**
- **SE1:** Thailand's Charoen Pokphand Group (CP Group) modernised poultry, aquaculture, and feed production. Its activities aligned with the government's agricultural commercialisation initiatives, which aimed to increase rural incomes and supply raw materials for domestic food processing and export.
 - **SE2:** In Singapore, Keppel Corporation and SembCorp developed industrial estates and port infrastructure, complementing the government's industrialisation strategy. Banks like OCBC and DBS mobilised domestic savings and financed both state projects and private ventures, enabling a stable investment environment.

5. 'Independent Southeast Asian governments had often prioritised economic growth over other economic goals.' How far do you agree with this statement? [30]

Possible Arguments

1. **The government's modernisation and expansion of the agriculture and industrial sector to ensure continued productivity and competitiveness showed that the priority was economic growth even if this meant increasing reliance for foreign influences.**
 - **SE1:** In order to ensure continued growth in its manufacturing sector, Malaysia shifted from commodity dependence (rubber, tin) towards electronics in the 1970s–80s through Free Trade Zones in Penang, driven by Western and Japanese demand. The government prioritised export growth over other concerns such as redistribution or self-reliance.
 - **SE2:** Singapore under Lee Kuan Yew prioritised export-oriented industrialisation (EOI) from the 1960s given its realisation that Singapore's limited markets would not limit its growth and ability to survive as a newly independent nation. Agencies like the Economic Development Board (1961) attracted multinational corporations (MNCs), turning Singapore into a manufacturing hub. GDP growth rates averaged 8–10% in the 1970s–80s, showing a clear emphasis on growth as the overriding objective.
2. **For some Southeast Asian countries, economic growth was seen a key economic goal particularly from the 1980s evident by efforts to liberalise trade and financial sector to sustain economic growth.**
 - **Context:** From the 1970s onwards, Southeast Asian governments liberalised trade and reformed their financial systems to attract foreign capital and integrate into the global markets in order to help sustain and expand different areas of growth.
 - **SE1:** Singapore established itself as a free-trade hub with virtually no tariffs and by developing a world-class financial centre. By the 1980s, it was a major site for offshore banking and a base for multinational corporations. These liberalisation policies prioritised rapid economic expansion over protectionist or redistributive goals.
 - **SE2:** Thailand reduced tariffs progressively and embraced export-oriented industrialisation (EOI) in the 1980s. It also liberalised its financial sector, opening to foreign banks and capital inflows. While this boosted growth — with GDP growth averaging 9% between 1987–1996.
3. **However, for many Southeast Asian countries, the economic goal of ensuring economic self-sufficiency, particularly in the immediate years after independence showed that growth was not necessarily a key priority for Southeast Asian governments over time.**
 - **SE1:** Sukarno's late Guided Democracy period (1959–65) pursued economic autarky, rejecting Western aid and prioritising independence from foreign influence. This collapsed the economy (inflation > 600% in 1965). The 1974 Malari riots against Japanese investment showed strong nationalist backlash — forcing the government to place limits on foreign ownership in key sectors. Hence showing how sovereignty over natural resources was often guarded even when growth opportunities from foreign investors were available.
 - **SE2:** Post-independence (1950s–70s), the Philippines pursued import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) with high tariffs and restrictions on foreign investment. Policies were justified as protecting "Filipino First" economic sovereignty, though they slowed competitiveness compared to export-oriented neighbours. The 1958 Filipino First Policy restricted foreign participation in domestic business. This safeguarded sovereignty but undermined export-driven growth.

- **SE3:** After reunification in 1975, Vietnam tried to implement a centrally planned economy, cutting off reliance on capitalist economies. Pursued food self-sufficiency through collectivised agriculture and limited foreign trade to socialist allies. This resulted in food shortages and stagnation by the 1980s forced eventual liberalisation.

4. For some Southeast Asian countries, economic growth was not seen as a priority, but rather equity being a key priority for Southeast Asian governments.

- **SE1:** Malaysia's New Economic Policy (NEP, 1971–1990) prioritised reducing ethnic inequality between Malays (bumiputera) and Chinese, with affirmative action in education, employment, and corporate equity. This sometimes deterred foreign investors and slowed growth in the short term, but it reflected a prioritisation of redistribution.
- **SE2:** Myanmar under Ne Win (1962–1988) pursued the “Burmese Way to Socialism,” prioritising self-sufficiency and equity over integration with global markets. While disastrous in terms of growth, this demonstrated that governments did not always privilege growth first.