
This document consists of 5 printed pages and 3 blank pages.

Section A

You **must** answer Question 1.

ASEAN

1 Read the sources and answer the questions which follow.

Source A

The extraordinary period of crisis in Southeast Asia has run its course and the task now is to adjust to our revised but continuing interests in the area, and to Asian hopes and requirements. The thing they fear the most is the loss of US interest in their future. In each country, the leaders interviewed had some trenchant observations or views worth noting:

President Suharto believes it is of critical importance that the US plays a discreet but active role in assisting the ASEAN countries.

Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, having little faith in the Thai and worried about Malaysia, looks to the US to provide selective but vital assistance to the ASEAN members.

Prime Minister Razak is focusing on ASEAN, with quiet American support, as a possible security blanket at a time when his insurgency problems could be compounded greatly if Hanoi so chooses.

Memorandum from US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to President Ford, 13 June 1975.

Source B

Nowhere has your leadership been more inspiring than in moulding the world's response to the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia. After the collapse of South Vietnam, ASEAN took a strong stand against Vietnamese expansionism. When Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1978, you recognized the threat and acted quickly. The strength of your commitment and the direction you've provided on this vital issue have been much admired by the United States. In 1981 ASEAN organized the International Conference on Kampuchea. We continue to support the basic principles for the settlement of the Cambodian situation agreed upon at that conference. ASEAN's efforts are consistent with American desires to bring peaceful resolution to the tragic cycle of events that has plagued the Cambodian people. United States considers itself a Pacific rim country, with a heavy stake in the outcome of events in this region.

Excerpt from Ronald Reagan's address to the ASEAN, May 1986.

Source C

"I throw caution to big countries, including Japan, not to try to influence ASEAN to suit their own interests. Indonesia, as the big nation among the member countries of ASEAN, would hit back if this were tried. We would not let member countries which are members of SEATO draw Indonesia into SEATO. The main purpose of ASEAN is to strengthen economically and culturally the countries in Southeast Asia through joint efforts. Most Southeast Asian countries have some experiences under the domination of Japan and will be careful in facing it. If Southeast Asian countries do not strengthen themselves, they would be crushed sooner or later by the big countries."

Indonesian Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, speaking at a press conference, 30 August 1967

Source D

The presence of Vietnamese troops in Cambodia is the result of China using the stooge Pol Pot clique against Cambodia and Vietnam. One must respect the rights of the peoples, particularly the right of the Cambodian people, to get rid of the genocidal Pol Pot regime and build their country in accordance with their aspirations. China is trying to create a diversion, by pitting Thailand and other ASEAN countries against the Indochinese countries, in order to wreck peace and stability in Southeast Asia. The trend towards peace, cooperation and friendship among Southeast Asian nations is developing because it is the earnest aspiration of hundreds of millions of Southeast Asia. All attempts by the Chinese expansionists in collusion with the U.S. imperialists, to oppose Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos and to pit them against the ASEAN countries are doomed to dismal failure.


Socialist Vietnam's Ministry of Foreign Affairs memorandum, August 1980.

Source E

One of the reasons for establishing the Asean Regional Forum (ARF) was to engage China. That was a wise decision. But the Spratly Islands issue is perhaps an example of where ASEAN is not in the driver's seat of the ARF, as some ASEAN countries are in dispute between themselves and with China over those coral reefs and sandbanks. Disputes between member countries put ASEAN at a disadvantage, as the Association is then not in a position to negotiate collectively with China. China has been able to insist on bilateral negotiations.

The Spratly Islands issue has detracted from ASEAN's leadership in the ARF. The meetings held between China and the ASEAN countries within the ARF framework over the years contributed to the building up of confidence between them, so that they were able to reach agreement outside the ARF. Yet ASEAN, which has always operated on a consensus basis, still lacks the ability to speak with a unified voice on sensitive political issues, which leaves it in a weak position in dealing with China. So, even as it commits to the tighter embrace of Beijing, ASEAN is courting other powers such as India.

A comment by a Malaysian academic 2003.

Source F

From a Japanese online journal article

Now answer the following questions:

(a) Compare Sources A and B on the role of the United States in Southeast Asia's regional security. [10]

(b) How far do Sources A-F support the view that external actors determined ASEAN's action? [30]

Section B

You must answer **two** questions from this section.

EITHER

- 2** “More a hindrance than a help.’ To what extent does this describe the military’s role in the political stability of post-independence Southeast Asia? [30]

OR

- 3** ‘Assimilation was more successful than accommodation in building national unity within independent Southeast Asian states.’ How far do you agree with this statement?
[30]

AND EITHER

- 4** “A story of unexpected success.” How far do you agree with this view on the economic performance in post-independence Southeast Asian states?
[30]

OR


- 5** How significant was the role of centralised planning in promoting industrialisation in Southeast Asian states before 1997?
[30]

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Section A



1 (a) Compare Sources A and B on the role of the United States in ASEAN. [10]

Similar View

Expected valid responses:

Paragraph 1: **How** are the sources' views **similar**?

- Both sources suggest that ASEAN relied on US backing to operate effectively in the regional security sphere.
- **A:** shows ASEAN leaders in the mid-1970s fearing “the loss of US interest” and requesting American involvement: Suharto wanted the U.S. to play a “discreet but active role,” Lee Kuan Yew saw it as providing “vital assistance,” and Razak sought American support as a “security blanket.” + Explanation
- **B:** “We continue to support the basic principles for the settlement of the Cambodian situation agreed upon at that conference.” “ASEAN's efforts are consistent with American desires to bring peaceful resolution to the tragic cycle of events that has plagued the Cambodian people.” + Explanation - stresses continued U.S. engagement. President Reagan praised ASEAN's “strong stand” on Cambodia and confirmed Washington's commitment to ASEAN principles, demonstrating that the U.S. still acted as guarantor of ASEAN's position in international diplomacy.

In both cases, ASEAN's regional role is depicted as enhanced rather than diminished by American involvement.

Paragraph 2: **Why** are the sources' views **similar**?

- Candidates would offer contextual knowledge to explain the reasons for the continued reliance on the United States.

Differing Views

How do the sources' views **differ**?

- Source **A** presents ASEAN as highly dependent on the U.S., with leaders actively appealing for support in the wake of the Vietnam War. ASEAN is presented more as a fragile grouping in need of external reassurance than an autonomous actor. **Source B** projects a picture of ASEAN leadership, with Reagan commending its “inspiring” stand against Vietnam and its organisation of the 1981 International Conference on Kampuchea. ASEAN appears more assertive, with the U.S. adopting the role of supportive partner rather than direct patron.

Why do the sources' portrayal **differ**?

- Both sources offer **differing** portrayal because of their different contexts and differing purposes.
 - **Source A** – internal U.S. memorandum from Kissinger to President Ford to provide assessment of the state of regional security for consideration of the President. Its candid references to ASEAN leaders' insecurities reflected the state of the Southeast Asian states in the 1970s when they were still grappling with domestic instabilities and needed an external security guarantor for the region. Candidates can also offer specific domestic and regional contextual knowledge to affirm the anxieties of the different states. Candidates would offer the context of American foreign policy in the early 1970s and their on-going interest in the region in spite of American withdrawal from Vietnam.
 - **Source B** – a public speech by Reagan, intended to flatter ASEAN ministers and reassure them of U.S. friendship. Its emphasis on ASEAN's “leadership” and “commitment” is more rhetorical than analytical, downplaying ongoing asymmetry in the relationship. Candidates would offer the context of American foreign policy in the mid-1980s to account for this rhetoric

Both sources highlight ASEAN's need for U.S. involvement in regional security, but they differ in presenting the United States as either indispensable patron (Source A) or admiring supporter (Source B). Taken together, they show both continuity in ASEAN's reliance on U.S. engagement and change in ASEAN's growing confidence in shaping regional diplomacy.

(b) How far do Sources A-F support the view that external actors determined ASEAN's action?

[30]

The hypothesis asks whether ASEAN was able to pursue an independent security role from its founding in 1967 to 2000. Independence implies freedom from reliance on external powers and the ability to act collectively to safeguard regional security. The sources divide into two sets. Sources C, B, and parts of E highlight ASEAN's aspirations and limited successes in acting autonomously: the 1967 founding vision (C), ASEAN's handling of the Cambodian crisis (B), and its creation of regional security mechanisms such as the ARF (E). In contrast, Sources A, D, E, and F expose ASEAN's structural dependence on great powers and its internal disunity, with A showing reliance on the US, D portraying ASEAN as manipulated by external forces, E underscoring weaknesses against China, and F reinforcing scepticism through satire.

Source C provides strong rhetorical challenge. Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik in 1967 insisted ASEAN would “hit back if any big nation tries to treat us to suit their interests,” stressing ASEAN's determination to resist external domination. As a founding statement, its purpose was to project unity and independence. While useful in capturing ASEAN's aspirations, its reliability is limited because ASEAN in 1967 lacked the capacity to enforce this stance.

Source B offers external validation of its independence. Reagan in 1986 praised ASEAN's “strong stand against Vietnamese expansionism” and organisation of the International Conference on Kampuchea. This suggests ASEAN was seen internationally as an autonomous actor shaping regional diplomacy. However, as a US presidential address to ASEAN ministers, it was a rhetorical exercise designed to flatter ASEAN and secure its cooperation in Cold War containment. Thus, its reliability lies more in how the US wanted ASEAN to see itself than in its actual independence.

Source E also partly challenge the hypothesis. The Malaysian academic acknowledges that ASEAN created the ARF in the 1990s and built “confidence between them [ASEAN and China].” As a retrospective academic view, the source is more balanced and less politically motivated, making it reliable in recognising ASEAN's institutional contributions. Yet, even here the emphasis is on process-building rather than hard security independence.

Together, these sources show ASEAN pursued an independent security role through diplomacy and institution-building, but the evidence is either aspirational (C), flattering (B), or limited in scope (E).

The strongest support comes from Source A. In a confidential memorandum to President Ford in 1975, Kissinger reported ASEAN leaders feared “the loss of US interest” and expected “a discreet but active role” for the US. As a private communication, it is likely candid, revealing ASEAN's dependence on US backing after the fall of South Vietnam. This undercuts the idea of independence, suggesting ASEAN required external guarantees to sustain its security.

Source D, from Vietnam's Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1980, denounced ASEAN as manipulated by “Chinese expansionists” and “US imperialists.” While ideologically biased

and seeking to discredit ASEAN's legitimacy, it still reflects how ASEAN was perceived externally — as lacking true independence. Its reliability lies not in factual accuracy but in showing ASEAN's contested credibility in the eyes of neighbours.


Source E supports the hypothesis more directly. It stresses that the Spratly Islands dispute showed ASEAN “not in the driver's seat” and “unable to speak with a unified voice,” leaving it weak in facing China. Coming from an academic in 2003, it benefits from hindsight and scholarly distance, making its critique of ASEAN's structural weakness highly credible.

Source F, a Japanese political cartoon, satirises ASEAN's impotence. As a cartoon, it exaggerates, but it is useful in reflecting contemporary perceptions that ASEAN lacked an independent role. Taken alongside A, D, and E, it reinforces the image of ASEAN as dependent, divided, and constrained.

When weighed together, the support set is more convincing than the challenge set. Sources C and B highlight ASEAN's aspirations and external praise but are weakened by their provenance as rhetorical statements. Source E provides the most balanced support but simultaneously undermines ASEAN by pointing to internal divisions. By contrast, Source A is particularly strong — as a confidential memorandum, it reveals ASEAN leaders' own recognition of their dependence on the US. Source D, though biased, adds an external regional perspective that ASEAN lacked credibility. Source E's critical hindsight and Source F's satire further expose ASEAN's structural limitations. Thus, ASEAN was able to pursue an independent security role in aspiration and occasionally in diplomacy, but in practice its autonomy was undermined by dependence on great powers and lack of unity.

Based on the insights of the different sources, perhaps a modified hypothesis would be : ASEAN pursued and at times projected an independent security role, but its actual independence was limited, fragile, and more rhetorical than real.

Section B



- 2 “More a hindrance than a help.’ To what extent does this describe the military’s role in the political stability in post-independence Southeast Asia? [30]

This question is based on the syllabus learning outcome: “*evaluate the factors that shaped the establishment of different forms of government across Southeast Asia over time*” and “*evaluate the outcomes of Southeast Asian governments in consolidating power in different contexts and over time.*”

Stronger answers would apply the historical concept of **cause and effect** by analysing how military interventions influenced political stability across Southeast Asia. Candidates need to unpack the two sides of the hypothesis: that the military acted as (a) a *hindrance* by undermining democratic institutions and entrenching authoritarian rule, or (b) a *help* by providing order and preventing state collapse in fragile post-independence contexts.

The best answers will also apply the concept of **change and continuity over time**. For instance, while early military interventions (e.g., Burma 1962, Indonesia 1965–66, Thailand coups) brought rapid change in regime structures, continuity in military dominance across decades often perpetuated cycles of instability, corruption, and authoritarianism. By contrast, in cases such as Indonesia under Suharto or Vietnam under Communist military-party rule, continuity of military dominance did deliver long-term regime stability, even if it curtailed political freedoms.

Candidates should also bring in **comparative contextualisation across Southeast Asia**:

Finally, stronger answers would also critically engage with **competing historical interpretations**: some historians stress the military as an indispensable stabilising actor in fragile post-colonial states; others argue it entrenched authoritarian rule and weakened the prospects of institutional development.

- 3 ‘Assimilation was more successful than accommodation in building national unity within independent Southeast Asian states.’ How far do you agree with this statement? [30]

This question is based on the syllabus learning outcome, “*evaluate the outcomes of Southeast Asian governments’ efforts to build national unity in different contexts and over time.*”

Stronger answers would unpack the key concepts of **assimilation** and **accommodation**.

The question requires candidates to **evaluate the extent to which assimilation was “more successful” than accommodation** in building unity. This involves:

1. **Cause and effect**: assessing whether assimilationist or accommodationist policies actually strengthened unity, or whether they deepened divisions by alienating minorities. For example, assimilation in Indonesia (Pancasila, Bahasa Indonesia as a

national language) created a sense of unity, but in Burma/Myanmar assimilationist Burmanisation intensified ethnic separatism.

2. **Change and continuity:** considering whether the relative success of assimilation versus accommodation shifted over time (e.g. initial success of Malaysia's accommodationist model in the 1950s–70s, later tested by May 1969 riots and the New Economic Policy; Indonesia's assimilationist model remained dominant but faced strains in 1997–98).
3. **Comparisons across states:** answers should not generalise but evaluate outcomes in different contexts, as assimilation was not uniformly successful, nor was accommodation always weak.

Stronger answers may also evaluate the **criteria for “success”** in national unity. Was success measured by the absence of separatism? By minority acceptance? By the durability of a regime's legitimacy? For instance, Singapore's accommodationist bilingual and multiracial policies arguably built enduring unity, contrasting with Burma's assimilationist failure.

Finally, candidates should recognise that the hypothesis may be **too absolute**. A balanced response might argue that **both assimilation and accommodation had mixed outcomes**: assimilation was effective in certain contexts (Indonesia, Vietnam) but divisive in others (Burma, southern Thailand), while accommodation fostered stability in some cases (Malaysia, Singapore) but faced challenges in others (Philippines, Mindanao).

The strongest answers would note that success depended on the political, ethnic, and historical context rather than one approach being universally superior.

- 4 “A story of unexpected success.” How far do you agree with this view on the economic performance in post-independence Southeast Asian states?
[30]

This question is based on the syllabus learning outcome: “evaluate the achievements and limitations of economic development in Southeast Asia after independence.” Stronger answers would see candidates using the historical concepts of cause and effect as well as change and continuity to frame their arguments.

Stronger responses will not only describe rapid growth but evaluate whether it was truly “unexpected” and universally “success.” They will analyse outcomes as the result of **actors and conditions (cause and effect)**, and situate them in the broader trajectory of **change and continuity** across time, balancing successes against limitations.

- **Core focus:** The question requires candidates to assess whether Southeast Asia’s post-independence economic performance can be best described as “an unexpected economic miracle.” Candidates must judge both the extent of “miracle” (rapid growth, industrialisation, integration into the global economy) and the extent to which it was “unexpected” (contrary to initial conditions, colonial legacies, or international expectations).
- **Using cause and effect:** Stronger answers would examine how **conditions** (colonial economic legacies, resource endowments, Cold War geopolitics, globalisation) and **actors** (domestic governments, foreign investors, international institutions) interacted to produce economic outcomes. This is to demonstrate that “miracle” was not simply a matter of luck but the result of interplay between actors and conditions.
- **Using change and continuity:** Candidates may argue that while the rapid take-off of the 1970s–1990s seemed “unexpected” against the poverty and instability of the immediate post-independence years, there were continuities that made growth possible. For instance, Southeast Asia inherited colonial infrastructure and trade networks, which created a foundation for integration into global markets. Stronger responses will highlight how some states (e.g., Myanmar, the Philippines) did not experience a “miracle,” showing continuity in stagnation or uneven development, which qualifies the verdict.
- **Balanced evaluation:** Stronger answers will avoid simply accepting the “miracle” narrative. They will assess limitations: uneven growth across the region, vulnerability to external shocks (1997 Asian Financial Crisis), persistent inequality, and dependence on foreign capital. Candidates might argue that the “miracle” was neither wholly unexpected (given state-led planning and Cold War aid) nor universal (with states like Laos and Burma largely excluded).
- **Critical scope:** Answers should make **comparative case study use** (e.g., Singapore and Malaysia as successful cases, Indonesia as mixed, the Philippines and Burma/Myanmar as underperformers). They should also examine different phases of development:
 - o **Immediate post-independence** (1950s–60s): instability, agricultural dependence, import-substitution efforts.
 - o **High-growth era** (1970s–mid-1990s): rapid industrialisation, foreign investment, export-led growth.
 - o **Crisis and aftermath** (1997–2000): exposure of vulnerabilities, questioning the sustainability of the “miracle.”

- 5 How significant was the role of centralised planning in promoting industrialisation in Southeast Asian states before 1997?

[30]

This question addresses the learning outcome: *evaluate the factors shaping economic change in different contexts and over time*, particularly in the industrial sector of Southeast Asian economies. Candidates are expected to analyse both domestic policies (centralised planning) and external factors influencing industrialisation.

Stronger responses would :

- Explain centralised planning as one key factor in industrialisation, explaining its objectives.
- Evaluate the causal impact relative to other factors (external trade, foreign investment, ethnic minority entrepreneurship).
- Analyse successes and limitations of planning policies (e.g., over-reliance on state, inefficiencies, or lack of private sector dynamism).
- Consider continuity and change: whether planning approaches evolved over time, and how these changes influenced industrialisation outcomes.
- Conclude with a judgement of significance, acknowledging the role of planning while situating it within the broader economic, political, and international context.