



HISTORY

Paper 1: The Cold War and the Modern World
(1945–1991)

No Additional Materials are required.

READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST

8838/01

29 August 2025 3 hours

An answer booklet will be provided with this question paper. You should follow the instructions on the front of the cover of the answer booklet. If you need additional paper, ask the invigilator for a continuation booklet.

Section A

Answer **Question 1**.

Section B

Answer **two** questions.

At the end of the examination, fasten all your work securely together.

The number of marks is given in brackets [] at the end of each question or part question.

Section A

You **must** answer Question 1.

THE END OF THE COLD WAR

1 Read the sources and answer the questions which follow.

Source A



A British cartoon from "The Independent" newspaper, 1988.

Source B

Bush admitted to Gorbachev at the Malta Summit that the United States had been 'shaken by the rapidity of the unfolding changes' in Eastern Europe. He had changed his own position 'by 180 degrees.' He was trying 'to do nothing that which would lead to undermining your position.' Perhaps with Reagan in mind, he promised that he would not 'climb the Berlin Wall and make high-sounding pronouncements.' But Bush went on to say: 'I hope you understand that it is impossible to demand of us that we disapprove of German reunification.'

A lot was implied in these exchanges. Bush was confirming that his administration had been caught off guard – as had everyone else – by what had happened. He was acknowledging Gorbachev's importance in these events: the United States did not wish to weaken him. But Bush was also signalling that the Americans and the West Germans intended now to push for German reunification, something that would have seemed wildly impractical only a few weeks earlier.

Source C

Freedom leads to prosperity. Freedom replaces the ancient hatreds among the nations with peace. Freedom is the victor. And now the Soviets themselves may, in a limited way, be coming to understand the importance of freedom. We hear much from Moscow about a new policy of reform and openness. Some political prisoners have been released. Certain foreign news broadcasts are no longer being jammed. Some economic enterprises have been permitted to operate with greater freedom from state control. Are these the beginnings of profound changes in the Soviet state? Or are they token gestures, intended to raise false hopes in the West, or to strengthen the Soviet system without changing it?

We welcome change and openness; for we believe that freedom and security go together, that the advance of human liberty can only strengthen the cause of world peace. There is one sign the Soviets can make that would be unmistakable, that would advance dramatically the cause of freedom and peace.

General Secretary Gorbachev, if you seek peace, if you seek prosperity for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, if you seek liberalisation: Come here to this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, open this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!

From Reagan's speech at the Brandenburg Gate, 12 June 1987.

Source D

As for the foreign policy aspect, there was the East-West confrontation, a rigid division into friends and foes, the two hostile camps with a corresponding set of Cold War attributes. Both the East and the West were constrained by the logic of military confrontation, wearing themselves down more and more by the arms race.

The mere thought of dismantling the existing structures did not come easily. However, the realisation that we faced inevitable disaster, both domestically and internationally, gave us the strength to make a historic choice, which I have never since regretted. De-ideologizing relations among States, which we proclaimed as one of the principles of the New Thinking, has brought down many prejudices, biased attitudes and suspicions and has cleared and improved the international atmosphere. I have to note, however, that this process has been more intensive and frank on our part than on the part of the West.

From a Nobel lecture by Gorbachev, 5 June 1991.

Source E

When Ronald Reagan took over the White House, the end of the Cold War not only seemed a very long way off, nobody in fact thought in such terms at the time, but in many respects it actually looked as if the USSR (and not the West) was winning [while] America's European allies were mired down in a politically bruising effort to deploy a new class of missiles at home. And, as many felt at the time, the United States stood on the cusp between one highly devastating decade and another whose prospects looked anything but bright.

Into this situation strode the ever-optimistic Reagan. The time had come, he announced, to reverse the tide of history. Indeed, instead of retreating, the United States should challenge its enemies. Reagan was always certain that in the end the West would win. He was so certain, in fact, that he even abandoned the niceties of nearly forty years of diplomatic convention that took it for granted that "containment" was America's preferred strategy toward the Soviet Union and replaced it with an altogether more aggressive policy that did not merely contest the Communist system more forcefully, but called its legitimacy into question. He combined a serious analysis of Soviet systemic weaknesses with a fairly coherent strategy of squeeze and pressure.

From a professor at the London School of Economics, 2015.

Now answer the following questions:

- (a) Compare and contrast the evidence provided by Sources C and D on the reasons for the end of the Cold War. [10]
- (b) How far do Sources A-E support the assertion that the end of the Cold War was unexpected? [30]

Section B

You must answer **two** questions from this section.

EITHER

- 2** To what extent was the deterioration of the Sino-Soviet relationship from the 1950s to the 1970s due to China's concerns over security? [30]

OR

- 3** How far do you agree that maintaining economic viability was the main driver of Japan–USA relations between 1952 and 1991? [30]

AND EITHER

- 4** To what extent did superpower interests influence the development of the Second Indochina War from 1959 to 1975? [30]

OR

- 5** How far was ASEAN able to achieve regional cooperation in its response to the Cold War in Southeast Asia from 1967 to 1991? [30]

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