

YIJC H1 HISTORY 2024 – POSSIBLE ESSAY OUTLINE RESPONSES

THEME 2 – COLD WAR & ASIA

CHAPTER 2 – Japan & the Cold War (1952 – 1991)

<u>Part I</u> Japan-US Relationship: Cooperation & Tensions over Time
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1.	How far was the development in Japan-US relations from 1952 – 1991 determined by the US?	
2.	How far were the tensions in Japan-US relations due to Japan’s domestic politics?	
	Vs	
	How far were the tensions in Japan-US relations due to Japan’s economic status?	
3.	To what extent did the Japan-US relationship remain unchanged from 1952 – 1991?	

What questions will YOU craft? Why so and how will your essay plan look like?

<u>Part II</u> Japan’s Responses to the Cold War & Impact
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4.	To what extent did Japan successfully respond to the Cold War to secure its interests from 1952 - 1991?	
5.	“The economic responses of Japan to the Cold War had a positive impact on US-Japan relations.” How far do you agree?	

What questions will YOU craft? Why so and how will your essay plan look like?

RECAP: Introduction Stand:

Summary of Overall Argument that ANSWERS the qn

- 1) **DEFINITION / OVERVIEW** (“This term can be defined as.....” / ‘The qn assumes that....’)
- 2) **KEY TERMS OF THE QN & TIME FRAME** (CONSISTENTLY?? - CHANGE / CONTINUITY?)
- 3) **ANALYSIS OF SIGNIFICANCE** (This ‘given factor’ is significant in terms of BECAUSE it.....)
- 4) **COUNTER COMPARISON LINKAGE with WHY so** (HOWEVER, it is too simplistic to.... BECAUSE....
OVERALL, COMPARED with the role of the GIVEN FACTOR, this is..... because.....)

Qn1) How far was the development in Japan-US relations from 1952 – 1991 determined by the US?

Essay Plan:

1) Largely determined by US in terms of.....(Securing Japan as a Security Alliance Ally to serve US Cold War Interests in Asia: Korea & Vietnam)

2) EVEN OVER TIME IN 1960s - LARGELY Determined by US to CONTINUE serve US Cold War Interests in Asia and DIS-ADVANTAGE JAPAN's INTERESTS DISPROPORTIONATELY that led to anger in Japan

3) EVEN in the later decades of the Cold War from 1970s, US CONTINUED to SHAPE Japan-US relations in DEFENCE COSTS BURDEN SHARING following US unhappiness with Japan over Economic Issues from 1970s

However.....

4) Counter: Too simplistic to focus TOTALLY on US as Japan had INDEPENDENT AGENCY in SHAPING the DIRECTION & MANNER OF its contribution to the US Cold War interests based on Japan's needs & considerations as well throughout the Cold War (early to later decades)

5) Counter: US-Japan relationship and the ACTIONS / INTERESTS of BOTH PARTIES was actually driven on and shaped by the BROADER GLOBAL SITUATION CONTEXT OF THE COLD WAR & ECONOMICS

Possible Intro Stand:

This question focuses on how much the US controlled and influenced the Japan-US relationship consistently during the Cold War from 1952 – 1991. It appears to a large extent that the US determined the Japan-US relations in terms of _____. However, to claim that the US was the only major force consistently determining how Japan-US relations were is simplistic and ignores how Japan's growing economic status by the 1970s, Japanese domestic politics and Japanese politicians' agency / choice were in influencing Japan-US relations in a way that was conducive to Japanese interests at the time and saw US interests and wishes sometimes taking a backseat. Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that overall the US was a predominant large influence in shaping Japan-US relations for regional stability in the Cold War that constantly sought to push the boundaries of Japanese actions towards greater contributions in defence and regional stability. Overall, BOTH Japan and US's interests and actions was actually driven on and shaped in the respective manners by the BROADER GLOBAL SITUATION CONTEXT of the Cold War & economics.

Eg of an Analysis PEEL Point Paragraph but without Evidence to Substantiate:

The US-Japan relationship was shaped from the beginning by security needs for US Cold War interests as seen in how the bilateral Security Treaty of 1951 between Japan and the US forged during the Korean War was focused PRIMARILY on the terms of CONTINUING the American military presence on Japanese

territory DESPITE ITS INDEPENDENCE with the peace treaty in 1952. This was not surprising given its strategic and geographical value and the context of aggressive events and Cold War fears at that time. This shows how much the US-Japan relationship was shaped and determined from right from the 1950s by the critical need for strategic security needs by the US in its calculation and implementation of its Cold War strategy.

(1) Given Factor – Significance 1 (PEEL)

LARGELY Determined by US - Securing Japan as a Security Alliance Ally to serve US Cold War Interests in Asia: Korea & Vietnam

P – Point (Topic Sentence)	<i>The development of Japan-US relations from the 1950s to the 1970s was largely determined by the US in ----- as it sought to ensure US Cold War strategic interests were met.</i>
E – Evidence (SELECTIVELY CHOOSE)	<i>For example, this was seen in how.....</i> ➤ <i>US focus was on stabilisation of Asia and to forestall the growth of communism in Japan and Asia (Domino Theory Fears)</i> ➤ <i>The US especially considered Okinawa vital to regional U.S. security interests especially after the events of 1949 and 1950 that reflected a worsening Cold War confrontation in Asia and domino theory fears materializing of the monolithic communist bloc out to destroy and take over the 'free world'. Forces on Okinawa would allow for power projection throughout Asia, address the growing Soviet threat, and permit the US to keep a closer eye on Japan (over which fears of revived militarism still existed initially).</i> - <i>The Korean War & subsequent Vietnam War confirmed to the US that it needed Okinawa with its unique geographical position as a logistical and strategic military base asset to provide the combat and support units for the Cold War conflicts that affected US interests. Along with military units came American families and the infrastructure to support them in Okinawa, such as clubs, schools, churches, and theatres. This led to a greatly increased U.S. footprint on the island.</i> - <i>In return, the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation & Security between Japan and the US, it stated explicitly that Japan and the US will respond to an attack against either party within Japan's territory and that Japan will provide land for US military installations to provide security for Japan and the 'Far East'.</i> ➤ <i>1960 Anpo Protests show how much imbalance the US had in its relationship with Japan as seen in how the protestors felt that the 1951 Security Treaty was too imbalanced toward American interests at the expense of Japan.</i> - <i>No input from the Japanese free press or elected representatives</i> - <i>Felt that the pacifist principles of the Constitution were being betrayed</i> - <i>Despite US Occupation ending in 1952, many American troops were still on Japan (esp in Okinawa), and this suggested an ongoing occupation in reality.</i>

E – Explain	<i>This was very significant in SHAPING THE MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL SECURITY ALLIANCE between the US & Japan because _____</i>
L – Link	<i>THUS / THEREFORE, this point / factor of _____ here was clearly a very MAJOR reason which enabled both countries to</i>

(2) Given Factor – Significance 2 (PEEL)

EVEN OVER TIME IN 1960s - LARGELY Determined by US to CONTINUE serve US Cold War Interests in Asia and DIS-ADVANTAGE JAPAN’S INTERESTS DISPROPORTIONATELY that led to anger in Japan

- *Japan PM Sato (1964 – 1972) had a secret agreement with the US that allowed it to bring US nuclear weapons into Japan and Okinawa. On April 1969, the anniversary of Japan’s abandonment of Okinawa to US military administration in exchange for regaining sovereignty, there were nation-wide protests in favor of reversion to full Japanese sovereignty.*
 - *In Tokyo, Zengakuren and other radical groups including workers, taunted police, erected barricades and instigated violent street battles.*
 - *Despite the protests, nothing changed as the conservative LDP remained in power, the US continued to use its base in Okinawa for the Vietnam War and public opinion had turned on the protestors after several violent incidents.*
- *In 1965, prominent intellectuals established Beheiren (Peace in Vietnam Committee) to protest the Vietnam War and Japan’s complicity, by virtue of war-related procurements including napalm that amounted to \$1 billion a year from 1966 – 1971. Between 1964 and 1973, Japanese perceptions of the US soured dramatically as a result.*
- *From 1967, the student movement on university campuses escalated into major clashes with police and educators, and also between leftish radical groups. Zengakuren was well-established on many university campuses and was prominent in protests that targeted that arrival at Sasebo naval base of the USS Enterprise, a nuclear-powered US naval vessel deployed for the Vietnam War.*

(3) Given Factor – Significance 3 (PEEL)

US CONTINUED to SHAPE Japan-US relations in DEFENCE COSTS BURDEN SHARING following US unhappiness with Japan over Economic Issues from 1970s

P – Point (Topic Sentence)	<i>Even in the later decades, the US continued over time to consistently shape the US-Japan DEFENCE ALLIANCE relationship especially in the aspect of defence cost burden sharing following American unhappiness with Japan over economic issues from the 1970s.</i>
E – Evidence	<i>For example, this was seen in how.....</i>
E – Explain	• 1977: Given the rising labour costs for Japanese workers, the impressive economic growth of Japan and the falling value of the US dollar currency, it all

	prompted the US to discuss with Japan additional cost-sharing initiatives, and Japan signed the first labour-cost sharing agreement with the US. - 3 additional labour-cost sharing agreements were signed with a target of having Japan pay about half of the total Japanese labour costs associated with the support of US forces in Japan by 1990. - Japan increased its share of the costs to station US troops in Japan: \$711M or 24% (1981) to \$1.7B, 31% (1987). - Japan made steady progress in strengthening its defense capabilities from 1985 to 1989, after significantly underfunding its defense program prior. - The US urged Japan to increase defense expenditures and accelerate the completion of its 5-year defense program originally designed to give Japan the ability to repel limited and small-scale invasions by 1984. But it was only until 1986, after SEVERAL US requests that Japan began to spend at a level necessary to address its minimum defense requirements. ➤ From 1978, Japan began paying base-hosting support that defrayed the costs of stationing US troops in Japan • 1979 Facilities Improvement Program: Meant to fund building projects to improve the quality of life for US forces - By 1987, the costs of the program had grown to 78.2 billion yen (over US\$560M) annually from its 1979 level of 32.7 billion yen (over US\$100M). - The costs CONTINUED over time to increase every year by more than US\$50M. US calculated that with these cost-sharing arrangements with Japan, US costs could be reduced by at least US\$600M annually. ➤ 1980s: PM Nakasone (1981 – 1986) agreed to expand the surrounding maritime area that Japan would defend and even shrugged off pacifist criticisms by boldly declaring that Japan was an ‘unsinkable aircraft carrier’
L – Link	THUS / THEREFORE, this point / factor of _____ here was clearly a very MAJOR contribution by the US towards the US-Japan relationship even over time in the later decades.

(4) Counter– Significance 1 (PEEL)

Too simplistic to focus TOTALLY on US as Japan had INDEPENDENT AGENCY in SHAPING the DIRECTION & MANNER OF its contribution

P – Point (Topic Sentence)	<i>However, it is too simplistic to focus SOLELY & TOTALLY on the US for DETERMINING FULLY the Japan-US relationship direction and essence as Japan actually had a surprising amount of independent agency to SHAPE the DIRECTION & MANNER of Japan’s contributions in the relationship even as early as the 1950s.</i>
E – Evidence	<i>For example, this was seen in how.....</i> ➤ <i>1950s: PM Yoshida avoided US call for Japan to rearm & emphasized economic recovery instead. Yoshida emphasized economic recovery and involved the war-renouncing Article 9 in the US-written 1947 Constitution for post-war Japan to ward off US demands for greater Japanese contributions.</i> ➤ <i>After Japan successfully joined the United Nations in Dec 1956, PM Kishi negotiated with the US to revise the Japan-US Security Treaty to make the relationship more mutual.</i> ➤ <i>1978 US Japan Guidelines for Defence Cooperation: Reflected the evolution of Japan’s policymaking process which coincided with heightened concern about long-term US intentions in the region given the context of that period which led to the overture initiative by Japan towards the US for an engagement study of the requirements of their respective militaries under the provisions of the bilateral security treaty, and this culminated in 1978 in the Guidelines.</i> - <i>U.S pushed for the Japanese government to include a reference to the Korean Peninsula, but Japan resisted. U.S. military also wanted Japan to commit to a larger operational role, but Japan resisted that as well.</i> - <i>The 1978 Guidelines opened the door for US-Japan relations in terms of joint planning and greater cooperation in many key defense areas, and provided an excellent opportunity to develop highly interoperable force, whereas in the past, a comprehensive evaluation of the adequacy of joint US-Japanese defense efforts had been lacking.</i> ➤ <i>CONTINUED on even in 1981, regarding the issue of collective self-defense, the Japanese government told the US under Reagan that Japan is only allowed by its Constitution to be confined to the minimum necessary level for the defense of the country, and cannot exceed more in a rebuff to the Americans’ request for an arms buildup.</i> ➤ <i>The Gulf crisis and war that began on 2 Aug 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait was for Japan a war of neither self-defense nor aggression committed by Japan, and hence was something that did not appear in the vocabulary or attention of most Japanese. Instead, post-war Japanese had long believed that not fighting other countries or being involved in wars between other countries was the legitimate way of pacifism and thus would earn the applause of the world. Under the extreme pacifism of post-war Japan, even participation in</i>

	<i>rear area support, transport and medical services was not supported or even contemplated by the Japanese people. Unable to play any positive role, Japan was internationally criticised and eventually offered \$13 billion in support.</i>
E – Explain	<i>This was very significant in SHAPING THE MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL SECURITY ALLIANCE between the US & Japan because _____</i>
L – Link	<i>HENCE, this clearly shows that one should be careful of over-hyping that the US HAD TOTAL FULL CONTROL over the US-Japan relationship. Nonetheless, one should not OVER-EXAGGERATE Japan's INDEPENDENCE & AGENCY as Japan, in turn, wanted the US to clarify its plans for reinforcing Japan in the event of attack, but the U.S. military was not willing to clarify that commitment in the same way was done for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).</i>

(5) Counter– Significance 2 (PEEL)

US-Japan relationship and the ACTIONS / INTERESTS of BOTH PARTIES was actually driven on and shaped by the BROADER GLOBAL SITUATION CONTEXT OF THE COLD WAR & ECONOMICS

- In the early years of the Cold War, there was greater concern within Japan that the alliance would inevitably involve Japan in a war, and the resistance to the notion of joint military planning stemmed from deep divisions over the US goals.
- In the 1950s, the US only showed signs of supporting Japan's Yoshida Doctrine as within Japan there had been a recession which had hit Japan's economy due to the drop in procurements related to the Korean War and tight fiscal policies. The international situation had also changed as military tensions in the Far East decreased dramatically following the Korean War truce of 1953 and the East-West competition shifted to long-term economic development: INCREASED emphasis on economics in US-Japan relations.
- Even over time in the 1960s, after the Nixon Doctrine in September 1969, the US began to reduce its troop levels in Asia given the problems the US was facing in Vietnam from the difficulties in the Vietnam War.
 - *Number of US military personnel stationed in Japan dropped in the wake of Vietnam War withdrawal: Increasing Japanese public opinion that they will be abandoned by the US in security matters*
 - *During Japanese PM Sato's visit to Washington in Nov 1969, President Nixon urged him to increase Japan's share of American responsibilities in Asia.*
 - *In Dec 1970, it was announced that the number of U.S. troops in Japan would be cut by 12,000.*
 - *The U.S. 7th Infantry Division was also withdrawn from South Korea. U.S. allies and friendly nations in Asia became concerned about a further withdrawal of U.S. forces from the region.*

Conclusion

Summarize overall argument of the essay and COMPARE Significance of GIVEN FACTOR vs COUNTER FACTORS' effect/role/significance over TIME (change/continuity) & explain WHY so

Qn2) How far were the tensions in Japan-US relations from 1952 – 1991 due to Japan's domestic politics?

Possible Intro Stand

Over the course of the Cold War, the relationship between Japan and the US was anchored firmly on a defence alliance to counter the spread of Communism in Asia, but over time this brought increasing tensions outwardly as the Japanese public and the US government became increasingly unhappy on various matters pertaining to independence and cost sharing. For Japan, its security planning process revolved around the **contentious domestic issue** of defining the purpose of the SDF as well as containment of the military's influence in policy formulation especially given Pacifist concerns and memories of WWII. The Japanese government thus had to create a policy-making process that provided for the country's defense needs while satisfying domestic critics and opponents of its policies and outwardly subordinate relationship with the US. These Japanese domestic politics played a _____ role in worsening / _____ the relationship NEGATIVELY with the US who grew INCREASINGLY FRUSTRATED with Japan over defence cost sharing burden and expanded cooperation to the region BECAUSE..... However, to claim that the TENSIONS over time in the Japan-US relationship during the Cold War was TOTALLY DUE ONLY to Japan's domestic politics is too simplistic. This is because it ignores how the underlying forces of the growing economic, power and outward inequality between Japan and the US brought unhappiness about in both Japan and the US that SPURRED on Japan's domestic politics and even the US to react strongly to global developments in response to the underlying issues of economics and power in the Japan-US relationship.

Essay Plan:

1) Domestic Politics played a CATALYST / SUPPORTING ROLE in FUELING on Tensions by(Seizing on Issues of Pacifism & Seeming Subordination of Japan to the US)

- *Japanese Public & Opposition Unhappiness over Pacifism & Outward Subordination to US (Power & Independence Dynamics)*
- **1965 3 Arrows Plan**
 - *A secret set of contingency plans was leaked to the Japanese opposition concerning how the SDF might respond to a military emergency on the Korean Peninsula and thus help US Cold War interests. Even though these plans were purely hypothetical in nature and did not formally commit Japan to assist the US in the event of a military conflict, its very existence was considered inflammatory in Japan and public opinion and criticisms from the opposition compelled PM Sato to place a virtual ban on such research for over 13 years. This meant that US Cold War interests of having Japan contribute more towards US Cold War strategic needs in Asia was hindered.*
- **Issue of Nuclear-Weapons & Japanese Public Unhappiness (1960s onwards)**
 - *LDP Secretary General, Fukuda raised a public protest when he said in 1967 that the majority of the LDP see the need to outgrow the 'nuclear allergy' and that Japan needed to adopt nuclear weapons. But PM Sato disagreed as a secret study he commissioned concluded to not recommend nuclear weapons in light of strong public opinion against it in light of the highly sensitive issues of national identity and opinion regarding nuclear weapons given Japan's war past...*

- HENCE, to ignore this group will have had disastrous effects on PM Sato's electoral chances given the HIGHLY EMOTIVE way the Japanese domestic politicians and public felt about nuclear weapons. Japanese leaders thus concluded that the DOMESTIC and international costs of such an option would be too costly.
- Outcome: Japan was thus RELUCATANT to embark on a major arms buildup and give in to US demands / interests that Japan have a greater military budget and resources and not over-rely on American resources instead.

➤ **Issue of Okinawa & Seeming Outward Subordination to US (Power)**

- On April 1969, the anniversary of Japan's abandonment of Okinawa to US military administration in exchange for regaining sovereignty, there were nation-wide protests in favor of reversion to full Japanese sovereignty. In Tokyo, Zengakuren and other radical groups including workers, taunted police, erected barricades and instigated violent street battles.
- Japanese public opinion towards the US spiraled downward as Japan's 'peace at any cost' type of pacifism and a traditional diplomatic inclination towards Asia came together in the movement against the Vietnam War; joined by the innate anti-Americanism of the Left in Japan's domestic politics. This led to active political participation of regular citizens which gained attention—Beheiren: Citizen's Federation for Peace in Vietnam - a pure peace movement, divorced of ideology and symbolized the coming of a new era for citizen participation in politics as part of Japan's response towards the Vietnam War in the 1960s and 1970s. This was clearly not fully fitting a typical client-state relationship that one may associate with in the US-Japan relationship as well, and in fact the Japanese government became caught between the anti-war movement by its citizens and its relationship with the US.

➤ **LINK to Qn Focus / Outcome: ?**

2) Even in the later decades of the Cold War, Domestic Politics CONTINUED to FUEL ON TENSIONS by..... (Seizing on Japanese Public's Anger on Pacifism, US Cold War Actions and Limiting the amount & manner of Japanese Contribution to US Cold War Strategy & Interests)

➤ **1970s: Issue of Nuclear Power & Defence Cooperation with US**

- CONTINUED on when the perceived decline of a US commitment to Asian security in the wake of the Vietnam War led many Japanese leaders to urge the adoption of a more INDEPENDENT military posture within the context of the US-Japanese alliance in the area of the NUCLEAR ISSUE.
- Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) took effect in 1970 in prohibiting all nuclear testing and established a global network of monitoring stations, BUT for Japan's Diet to RATIFY / agree to be part of this NPT had implications on Japan's status, and commercial advantage. This raised highly sensitive issues in Japan's domestic politics on national identity with a vocal sector of Progressives on the Left EMBRACING the ANTI-NUCLEAR movement especially given Japan's war past. But on the Right of the domestic politics were political conservatives who were reluctant to close the door to Japan's inclusion amongst the nuclear powers as this means losing out on nationalist pride.

- *Linking Japan's national military planning to greater coordination with the US was impossible for more than 10 years after the 1960 Security Treaty was revised given domestic political constraints and criticisms. But once the 1976 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) was on its way to becoming national policy with the LDP mollifying its critics by announcing that Japan would not spend more than 1% of its GNP on defense, Japan's National Defense Council director-general Sakata moved quickly to engage the American government in discussions about how the basis of Japan's national defense planning in the form of joint operations between the Japanese and American militaries would be achieved.*
- **EVEN CONTINUED OVER TIME in 1980s: Issue of Nuclear Power & Defence Cooperation**
- *Factionalism, bureaucratic in-fighting, and persistent suspicions regarding the military **CONTINUED to INFLUENCE & SHAPE Japan's relationship with the US & foreign policy**=hampered Japanese defense policymaking after the re-intensification of the Cold War in the late 1970s.*
- *In 1986, when PM Nakasone linked raising defense spending above 1% of GNP to a revival of Japanese national pride and defense consciousness, LDP moderates and rival conservatives like Fukuda **SIDED with the LEFTIST OPPOSITION to DELAY defense spending.***
- **LINK to Qn Focus / Outcome: FUELED on tension**

However....

3) Japan's Changing Economic Status by 1970s at EXPENSE OF US ECONOMY: MORE CRITICAL & IMPACTFUL than Domestic Politics in DIRECTLY TRIGGERING tensions in Japan-US relations because.....

- *1977: Given the rising costs for Japanese workers, the impressive economic growth of Japan and the falling value of the US dollar currency, it all prompted the US to discuss with Japan additional cost-sharing initiatives, and Japan signed the first labour-cost sharing agreement with the US.*
- *3 additional labour-cost sharing agreements were signed with a target of having Japan pay about half of the total costs associated with the support of US forces in Japan by 1990. Japan increased its share of the costs to station US troops: \$711M or 24% (1981) to \$1.7B, 31% (1987).*
- *Japan made steady progress in strengthening its defense capabilities from 1985 to 1989, after significantly underfunding its defense program prior. The US urged Japan to increase defense expenditures and accelerate the completion of its 5-year defense program originally designed to give Japan the ability to repel limited and small-scale invasions by 1984. But it was only until 1986, after SEVERAL US requests that Japan began to spend at a level necessary to address its minimum defense requirements.*
- *1985 Plaza Accord: saw Japan being asked to boost imports into Japan by coordinating currency purchases amongst the G5 countries to strengthen the Japanese Yen, and for Japan to adopt low interest rates and fiscal expansion to boost domestic demand for these imports into Japan. Japan even spent huge amounts of money for local governments in Japan to invest in various projects like roads, bridges and amusement parks to stimulate demand.*
- *To contain Japan's trade surpluses with the US, the US forced Japan through various acrimonious negotiations to 'voluntarily' limit their sales to the US, most notably in textiles (1972), steel (1969,*

1978), color TVs (1977) and automobiles (1981 – 1993). In 1988, the US Congress even passed a trade bill ('Super 301') clause that granted the US government the power to unilaterally decide that the domestic markets of Japan or other countries were unfairly closed to imports and to therefore unilaterally impose penalties on exporters of those countries in retaliation. This allowed the US to threaten Japan with sanctions from 'Super 301' to enforce access to Japanese markets for US companies to export in supercomputers, satellites and wood products.

- **LINK to Qn Focus / Outcome: ?**

4) US Selfish Actions & Strategic Needs: Outcome of Negativity & Resentment in US-Japan Relations & SHAPED / FUELED on DOMESTIC UNHAPPINESS & POLITICS in Japan against US

- *After the 1971 Nixon Shock that saw the US abandon the gold standard and allow the cost of the US dollar to fluctuate, it saw the value of the Japanese currency (Yen) rise sharply and made Japan's exports considerably more expensive. Nixon Shock marked a new era of chronic tension in the partnership between Japan and the US as Japan was unhappy in not being consulted by the US. Japan began to open diplomatic and economic links with China in the 1970s, and by the 1980s China became one of Japan's leading trading partners.*
- *The 1973 Oil Shock ended Japan's extraordinary era of double-digit economic growth as the higher energy prices sparked a recession and worst inflation since 1940s. It highlighted the vulnerability of a resource-poor economy like Japan in an interdependent world and powerfully recalled Japan's experience with scarcity during the wartime years.*
- *In 1972, as the US drew down its military involvement in Asia after the Vietnam War and returned Okinawa to Japan, it STILL retained access to its bases on Okinawa which host most of the US forces based in Japan, facilitating the projection of American power. The US-Japan Status of Forces Agreement (which grants the US military extraterritoriality on Okinawa) creates frustration amongst Japanese when accidents and crimes occur.*
- ***EVEN over time In the 1980s.....*** *for the FSX Fighter Aircraft production, Japanese manufacturers saw the need to keep their aircraft design and production bases alive, therefore supporting the view that the FSX should be a Japanese-developed fighter. On the other hand, American politicians, influenced by negative media portrayals, believed that Japan was an economic threat to the US as evidenced in Japan's success in areas such as automobiles and electronics. In 1983, Japan, in view of the improvement in its technological level, decided to open the way for the transfer of its military technology to the U.S. as an exception to the Three Principles of Arms Exports. Under pressure from Congress, President Bush's administration agreed to "review" the FSX agreement in which Japan had effectively given up what its own industry wanted for the sake of alliance cooperation. This was built on the fear that the FSX was another example of how Japan was going to take advantage of the US. The results of the review were cosmetic, surface-level changes, but there was extreme anger and disillusionment on the Japanese side.*
- ***LINK TO QN FOCUS WITH COMPARISON / OUTCOME of this POINT here:*** ***It was SUCH ACTIONS that were MORE IMPACTFUL than the given factor of _____ (eg: Domestic Politics) as these CONSISTENTLY FUELED RISING UNHAPPINESS IN JAPAN that SHAPED its DOMESTIC OPINION & CORRESPONDINGLY its POLITICS to affect the US-Japan relationship negatively as a result.***

Possible Topic Sentences

- Eg: The tensions in Japan-US relations from _____ was to an extent affected by Japan's domestic politics as it _____.
- Eg: Even in the later years over time, the tensions in Japan-US relations CONTINUED to be LARGELY affected NEGATIVELY in resentment _____ as it _____.
- Eg: HOWEVER, a deeper analysis reveals that this counter factor of _____ is MORE / LESS CRITICAL than _____ (given factor) BECAUSE.....

Qn3) To what extent did the Japan-US relationship remain unchanged from 1952 – 1991?

Qn Analysis:

- TIMELINE QN: 1950s to 1991 (CW period) - positive? Negative? Dependence?
- REMAIN UNCHANGED??? CONSTANTLY CONSISTENT (WHEN? FOREVER? ONLY for 2 decades? And IN TERMS OF WHAT.....)
- HOWEVER.... There must be some change (TO WHAT EXTENT / WHAT DEGREE / IN TERMS OF WHAT/ WHEN)

Essay Plan:

1) US/Japan Relationship Remain unchanged **CONSISTENTLY THROUGHOUT CW IN TERMS OF... **SECURITY ALLIANCE PARTNERSHIP** against Communism**

- a) **Early CW**
- b) **Later CW: EVEN IN THE LATER DECADES OF THE CW where there was some tension over economics and defence cost sharing, the SECURITY ALLIANCE CONTINUED to.....STAY STRONG AS PARTNERS in their defence cooperation against Communism in the CW in Asia.**

Evidence (ACROSS TIME to show CHANGE/CONTINUITY):

- **Korean War, Vietnam War (Domino Theory), Japan Red Scare / Purge (Fear of Soviet/China expansion etc), 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation & Security DESPITE presence of Japan Domestic Protests & Opposition on Japan Govt Relations with US**
- *1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty & 1951 US-Japan Security Treaty profoundly influenced Japan's foreign relations in Asia as it reintegrated Japan into the region mostly on Washington's terms in support of US Cold War agenda to contain the Soviet Union/China and to target the spread of Communism happening in the form of regional conflicts in Korea and subsequently Indochina.*
- *Even after the US Occupation of Japan, 260,000 US military personnel remained in Japan with their bases and facilities covering 1352 square kilometers, serving as a vital operational support base for combat operations in the Korean and Vietnam wars as part of the US global containment strategy against the monolithic Communist bloc – **a reflection of much the US Cold War strategy was shaping Japan's relations, policies and outlook even after the 1950s.***
- *In the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation & Security, it stated explicitly that Japan and the US will respond to an attack against either party within Japan's territory and that Japan will provide land for US military installations to provide security for Japan and the 'Far East'. (DESPITE PROTESTS)*
- *EVEN in the 1970s.....Japan PM Sato (1964 – 1972) had a secret agreement with the US that allowed it to bring US nuclear weapons into Japan and Okinawa. On April 1969, the anniversary of Japan's abandonment of Okinawa to US military administration in exchange for regaining sovereignty, there were nation-wide protests in favor of reversion to full Japanese sovereignty.*

- 2) However....there was **SOME CHANGE (BOTH POSITIVE & NEGATIVE)** in the **DEGREE OF CLOSENESS & COOPERATION** **FROM** the 1970s when Japan became richer and the US-Japan Security Alliance **CHANGED in terms of MORE PUBLIC TENSIONS ARISING over DEFENCE COSTS BURDEN SHARING & COOPERATION** as US felt unhappy over economic issues with Japan.

- *Eg: 1970s' additional labour-cost sharing agreements that Japan undertook with US*
- *Eg: 1978 US Japan Guidelines for Defence Cooperation: Reflected the evolution of Japan's policymaking process which coincided with heightened concern about long-term US intentions in the region given the context of that period which led to the overture initiative by Japan towards the US for an engagement study of the requirements of their respective militaries under the provisions of the bilateral security treaty, and this culminated in 1978 in the Guidelines. These opened the door for US-Japan relations in terms of joint planning and greater cooperation in many key defense areas, and provided an excellent opportunity to develop highly interoperable force, whereas in the past, a comprehensive evaluation of the adequacy of joint US-Japanese defense efforts had been lacking.*
- *Eg: Nakasone (INCREASED Sea Zone area that Japan will defend)*
- *Eg: FSX Fighter Jet & Fukuda Doctrine (Japan would never become a military power)*
- *Analysis: Japan is BECOMING (change) MORE INVOLVED to contribute to regional stability with increased military budget and cooperation with the US military formally (ALBEIT / BUT this was done in SMALL STEPS based on JAPAN's OWN COMFORT & INTERESTS & BOUNDARIES)*
- *The evolution of Japan's policymaking process coincided with heightened concern about long-term US intentions in the region given the context of that period which led to the overture initiative by Japan towards the US for an engagement study of the requirements of their respective militaries under the provisions of the bilateral security treaty, and this culminated in 1978 in the Guidelines.*

Possible Intro Stand

The critical moment for the determination of Japan's response to the Cold War came in 1950 when the Korean War made Japan strategically important to the US as its main ally in Asia to be drawn into a regional defense system and to remilitarize it given its strategic location. This **Japan-US relationship remained unchanged in terms of** the security alliance and defence cooperation between both sides consistently from 1952 – 1991 to confront the Cold War strategic challenges of Communism in Asia. However, while both were consistently in an alliance, one should note that mostly from 1952 – 1991, Japan's role in the US Cold War strategy and their relationship was **LARGELY transformed from** a rear basing area for combat operations in the Korean and Vietnam Wars to that of participant in the regional military balance of forces which **saw varying levels of TENSION creep into the relationship over time as both sides reacted to developments and Japan's domestic politics and rising power.** Japan's role in US strategy during the latter part of the Cold War also reflected Japan's great economic and technological strength, the growing capability of the Japanese Self-Defence Force (SDF), as well as the need to respond to improvements in Soviet naval and air deployments in the Pacific.

Possible Topic Sentences

- 1) *Eg: The Japan-US relations was unchanged in terms of the alliance between both sides to cooperate in defence matters consistently from the 1950s – 1991, although it varied / differed over time in the LEVEL / INTENSITY / SCOPE of defence cooperation.*
- 2) *Eg: Even in the later decades of the Cold War, the Japan-US relations CONTINUED OVER TIME to be unchanged in terms of the alliance between both sides to cooperate in defence matters.*
- 3) *Eg: HOWEVER, from the 1970s onwards, the Japan-US relations CHANGED to become MORE NEGATIVE / HOSTILE / TENSE in terms of..... Because.....*
- 4) *Eg: Beyond this change in the increased tensions in the Japan-US relationship from the 1970s, there was also a CHANGE in terms of.....GREATER COOPERATION GUIDELINES & INCREASED MINOR JAPANESE contributions towards the US security needs of its partner for regional stability.*
- 5) *Eg: With Japan's rising economic status and US pressure, the Japan-US relations ALSO CHANGED in terms of there being a greater cost burden sharing by Japan for the costs associated with having US forces based in Japan that benefitted Japan's security needs as well.*

Qn4) To what extent did Japan successfully respond to the Cold War to secure its interests from 1952 - 1991?

Define Japan's Interests – Stay safe in CW, grow economy to become rich, stay pacifist.

Essay Plan:

1) Largely SUCCEEDED in terms of SAFETY in SECURITY DEFENSE against COMMUNISM THROUGHOUT THE CW without affecting its growth strategy or pacifist constitution

2) EVEN in the later period, it CONTINUED to LARGELY SUCCEED in terms of ECON DIPLOMACY of Engaging China and Southeast Asia pragmatically to GROW TO BECOME A RICH COUNTRY STABLE ENOUGH TO WITHSTAND APPEAL OF COMMUNISM by 1970s

HOWEVER.....

3) Unsuccessful in terms of (Generating Some Fear by Asian Neighbours about Japan's Economic Rise by the 1970s that affected its Diplomacy Aims of Growth for Stability)

- Eg: Fukuda Doctrine – Japan would never become a military power
- Eg: Increasing engagement with ASEAN & China

4) However: Unsuccessful in terms of..... (Generating some short-term Tensions with Main Security Partner USA over Economic Trade, Defence Cost Burden Sharing, Role of Japan in Regional Cold War & Military Technology Cooperation)

- Outcome: Generated some domestic dissent over Japan govt approach with the US
- Significance: Affected relationship and public image of the security alliance that put Japan's security at risk.

(1) Given Factor Significance 1

- Point / Topic Sentence: In terms of operational cooperation between the US & Japanese militaries, the Japanese government's SUCCESSFUL CONSISTENT policy of making use of hosting US military deployments not only contributed to Japan's own defense needs but made the presence of US forces in the region certain that brought regional stability for Japan's growth.
- Evidence: From 1950 with the outbreak of the Korean War and worsening Cold War fears with the Sino-Soviet treaty of friendship that seemed to convey an aggressive monolithic Communist bloc out to take over the world, Washington sought a greater military contribution from Tokyo. However, Japan PM Yoshida emphasized economic recovery
- Explain: By 1954 the US government began to show signs of supporting PM Yoshida's line focusing first on economic reconstruction over or before rearmament. Within Japan that year, there had been a dramatic change in the domestic and international climate that made such a shift necessary as a recession had hit Japan's economy due to the drop in procurements related to the Korean War and tight fiscal policies.
- Evidence: When US forces were reduced in the 1970s, Japan's government realized for the first time the need for a direct dialogue over how military cooperation outlined in the bilateral treaty would be implemented.

- LINK: SO WHAT??

(2) Given Factor Significance 2:

OVER TIME CONTINUED to SUCCEED in terms of TAKING ADVANTAGE OF GLOBAL SITUATION & ADOPTING ECON DIPLOMACY to Engage China & Southeast Asia Pragmatically to Grow Rich & Stable

- Point / Topic Sentence: Even in the later decades, the additions to the Yoshida Doctrine showed that Japan was still successful in looking after its security and costs concerns as it increasingly defining its grand national strategy for steering the country in the context of long-term economic interests by taking advantage of and being aware of the global situation through its pragmatic economic diplomacy with China and Southeast Asia, but yet not being overly militaristic.
- Evidence:
- **Japan SDF:** After the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1952, Tokyo set up in 1954: the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), the MSDF, and the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF). In return, Yoshida obtained US agreement not to deploy these forces outside of Japanese sovereign territory and the equipment was all supplied by the US. By 1960, the budget to support this force had grown to almost \$0.5 billion, almost \$100M more than Australia spent on defense at the time. Japan's expansion of these forces engendered significant opposition from the political left in Japan, particularly the Japanese Communist Party and the Japanese Socialist Party. Protests boiled over in 1960 during the riots that surrounded the revision of the Mutual Security Treaty with the US.
- **1960 demonstrations** in Japan against the treaty with the US chastened the conservatives in Japan's domestic politics as it showed them that if they were to continue on this approach they will be driven from power from losing support from the people who were against this. PM Ikeda seized on this and re-established domestic tranquility by concentrating on policies of managed economic growth through his income doubling plan that targeted to double the national income within a decade by taking advantage of the unprecedented opportunities with the US alliance to expand Japan's international trade globally with US support.
- **3 Non-Nuclear Principles (1967):** PM Sato enunciated the 3 Non-Nuclear Principles: Prohibit the production, possession or introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan. BUT PM Sato was aware of repeated US violations of these principle and in secret protocols, the Japanese government actually gave the US military permission to keep nuclear weapons in Okinawa after its reversion to Japan in 1972 and to 'transit' through Japan planes and ships carrying nuclear weapons.
- LINK: SO WHAT??

HOWEVER.....

(3) Counter Factor 1:

Strained Relations with NEIGHBOURS over Fears about Japan's Rise by 1970s

- Point / Topic Sentence: NONETHELESS, Japan was not always fully successfully in responding to the Cold War challenges as seen in how its RISING ECONOMIC STATUS resulting from its ALLIANCE PARTNERSHIP with the US RESULTED in anger and uneasiness from its Asian neighbours who harboured mistrust due to memories of WWII. BUT Japan MANAGED this by helping with reparations & proclaiming the 1977 Fukuda Doctrine that:
 - *Japan would never become a military power*
 - *Japan would nurture trust with Southeast Asian countries*
 - *Japan would promote peace and prosperity in the region*
- Japanese reparations to its neighbours in Southeast Asia from 1955 to 1977 totaled some \$1.5 billion, a sum not insignificant for Japan at that time. But the payment of reparations was not merely the simple payment of damages caused by the war as it also became a way in which export markets could be developed for Japanese goods through the payment of reparations in the good of goods that led to the increased sales by Japanese companies paid by the Japanese government in Yen for the overseas country recipients.
- Japan also sought to transfer technical know-how with no strings attached. It contributed 20.25 trillion yen worth of overseas development assistance (ODA) to Asean from 1968 to 2022, through technical cooperation, low-interest loans and grants. ODA projects have included infrastructure such as schools, hospitals, roads, bridges, dams and sewage systems.
- Japan PM Fukua also sought to offer reassurance in the wake of the US withdrawal from Southeast Asia following defeat in the Vietnam War. These principles of the Fukuda Doctrine heralded a significant strengthening of cooperation between Japan and Southeast Asian countries as Tokyo embraced 'heart-to-heart' diplomacy and promoted enhanced cultural and educational relations. This reveals how diplomatic relations are not always stagnant and held hostage to history's memory of conflict and tension, and Japan became a major investor and trading partner of Southeast Asia; even to the point of becoming a partner of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), and the Asian Development Bank.
- LINK: SO WHAT??

(4) Counter Factor 2:

Strained Relations with US in 1970s over Economic Trade Deficits

- Point / Topic Sentence: However, Japan was not always fully successfully in responding to the Cold War challenges as seen in how after the 1971 Nixon Shock, it marked a new era of chronic tension in the partnership between Japan and the US as Japan was unhappy in not being consulted by the US and highlighted the vulnerability of a resource-poor economy like Japan in an interdependent world.
- *Evidence: Japan began to open diplomatic and economic links with China in the 1970s, and by the 1980s China became one of Japan's leading trading partners.*

- *Evidence: 1971 Nixon Shock that saw the US abandon the gold standard and allow the cost of the US dollar to fluctuate, it saw the value of the Japanese currency (Yen) rise sharply and made Japan's exports considerably more expensive.*
- *Evidence: In the 1970s, Japan's trade balance with the US shifted towards Japanese imports flooding the US market that overwhelmed the amount of US exports to Japan. For example, 27 US firms produced TVs at US factories in 1955 but by the 1980s, only one (Zenith) remained as they lost out to Japanese competitors! By the mid 1980s, Japanese exports to the US were valued at more than double the amount of US exports to Japan, and annual US trade deficits with Japan stood at roughly US\$50 billion dollars!*
- *Evidence: To contain Japan's trade surpluses with the US, the US forced Japan through various acrimonious negotiations to 'voluntarily' limit their sales to the US, most notably in textiles (1972), steel (1969, 1978), color TVs (1977) and automobiles (1981 – 1993). In 1988, the US Congress even passed a trade bill ('Super 301') clause that granted the US government the power to unilaterally decide that the domestic markets of Japan or other countries were unfairly closed to imports and to therefore unilaterally impose penalties on exporters of those countries in retaliation. This allowed the US to threaten Japan with sanctions from 'Super 301' to enforce access to Japanese markets for US companies to export in supercomputers, satellites and wood products.*

So what? Link??

- This brought tensions between the US & Japan out into the open over economic disputes and affected a COHERENT UNIFIED security partnership to confront the Cold War threat of Communism.

(5) Counter Factor 3:

Tensions with US Ally that brought Cracks to Security Alliance and Japan's Security: Over Costs of US Forces in Japan & Military Defence Tech

Point / Topic Sentence: IN ADDITION, beyond tensions over economics, Japan's attempts to fully rely on the US for security and to secure a unified public image of a strong Japan-US security alliance to confront the Cold War security threat was hindered even in the 1970s and 1980s by tensions with the US over defence burden cost sharing and military defence technology and cooperation.

Evidence:

- *The Status of Forces Agreement (1960) between Japan and the US gave the legal basis for stationing US troops in Japan and assigned to both sides the financial responsibilities for related costs.*
- *1977: Given the rising labour costs for Japanese workers, the impressive economic growth of Japan and the falling value of the US dollar currency, it all prompted the US to discuss with Japan additional cost-sharing initiatives, and Japan signed the first labour-cost sharing agreement with the US.*
- *Japan increased its share of the costs to station US troops in Japan: \$711M or 24% (1981) to \$1.7B, 31% (1987). Japan made steady progress in strengthening its defense capabilities from 1985 to 1989, after significantly underfunding its defense program prior.*

- *The US urged Japan to increase defense expenditures and accelerate the completion of its 5-year defense program originally designed to give Japan the ability to repel limited and small-scale invasions by 1984. But it was only until 1986, after SEVERAL US requests that Japan began to spend at a level necessary to address its minimum defense requirements.*
- *In the 1980s for the FSX Fighter Aircraft production, Japanese manufacturers saw the need to keep their aircraft design and production bases alive, therefore supporting the view that the FSX should be a Japanese-developed fighter. On the other hand, American politicians, influenced by negative media portrayals, believed that Japan was an economic threat to the US as evidenced in Japan's success in areas such as automobiles and electronics. Under pressure from Congress, President Bush's administration agreed to "review" the FSX agreement in which Japan had effectively given up what its own industry wanted for the sake of alliance cooperation. This was built on the fear that the FSX was another example of how Japan was going to take advantage of the US. The results of the review were cosmetic, surface-level changes, but there was extreme anger and disillusionment on the Japanese side.*
- LINK: SO WHAT??

Conclusion

Summarize overall argument of the essay and COMPARE Significance of GIVEN FACTOR vs COUNTER FACTORS' effect/role/significance over TIME (change/continuity) & explain WHY so

Qn 5) “The economic responses of Japan to the Cold War had a positive impact on US-Japan relations.” How far do you agree?

Possible Intro Stand:

Japan’s response to the Cold War of shunning international political-military commitments while concentrating on economic growth was initiated by PM Yoshida in the 1950s and elaborated upon by his successors till the end of the Cold War. Japan’s pragmatic economic responses to the Cold War – through taking advantage of the global open-door free trade system with US support, providing reparations and economic linkages with its Asian neighbors, and cultivating economic links with China – were LARGELY POSITIVE / BENEFICIAL to the US-Japan relationship CONSISTENTLY OVER TIME THROUGHOUT THE COLD WAR even till the later decades BECAUSE it brought mutual benefits to both US and Japanese interests. Japan came to be a major economic power by the 1970s which gave Japan the capability to uplift economically its Asian neighbors with the approval of the US who saw the merits of this as being in line with its Cold War containment strategy to shore up countries economically against Communism. For Japan, this allowed it to grow to become rich and the prevention of the Communization of the region through stabilizing its neighbors was a positive comprehensive security concept. However, it is too simplistic to claim that Japan’s economic response was FULLY POSITIVE ONLY as there were SOME NEGATIVE ASPECTS by the 1970s in terms of bringing about TENSIONS WITH THE US over worsening trade deficit and defence cost-sharing and cooperation.

Essay Plan:

- 1) Largely Positive in terms of..... (Yoshida Doctrine allowed Japan to grow to be a stable partner of the US to counter Communism in Asia and to afford US military bases in Japan for US Cold War Strategy in Korea & Vietnam) = Useful Stable Cold War Strategic Partner
 - *US focus was on stabilisation of Asia and to forestall the growth of communism in Japan and Asia (Domino Theory Fears) = US especially considered Okinawa vital to regional U.S. security interests especially after the events of 1949 and 1950 that reflected a worsening Cold War confrontation in Asia and domino theory fears materializing of the monolithic communist bloc out to destroy and take over the ‘free world’. Forces on Okinawa would allow for power projection throughout Asia, address the growing Soviet threat, and permit the US to keep a closer eye on Japan (over which fears of revived militarism still existed initially).*
 - *The Korean War & Vietnam War confirmed to the US that it needed Okinawa with its unique geographical position as a logistical and strategic military base asset to provide the combat and support units for the Cold War conflicts that affected US interests. In return, the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation & Security, stated explicitly that Japan and the US will respond to an attack against either party within Japan’s territory and that Japan will provide land for US military installations to provide security for Japan and the ‘Far East’*
- 2) EVEN in the later period, it CONTINUED to be POSITIVE in terms of... (Spurring Stability in Asia/Region through Economic Diplomacy to Counter Communism) = Useful Stable Cold War Partner
 - *Eg: Japanese reparations to its neighbours in Southeast Asia from 1955 to 1977 totaled some \$1.5 billion, a sum not insignificant for Japan at that time. It also became a way in*

which export markets could be developed for Japanese goods through the payment of reparations in the good of goods that led to the increased sales by Japanese companies paid by the Japanese government in Yen for the overseas country recipients.

- *Eg: By the end of the 1980s, Japan was not only the world's greatest creditor nation, it was also the world's largest aid donor. Nearly two-thirds of this aid went to Asian countries, amounting to a staggering 6 to 7 times the sum of annual US aid to the region! Transfer technical know-how with no strings attached - contributed 20.25 trillion yen worth of overseas development assistance (ODA) to Asean from 1968 to 2022, through technical cooperation, low-interest loans and grants. ODA projects have included infrastructure such as schools, hospitals, roads, bridges, dams and sewage systems.*
- *US President Johnson in 1967 thus asked Japan to buy \$500 million in US bonds, provide a special fund of \$100 million for the Asian Development Bank, donate televisions to South Vietnam for educational purposes and even build hospitals there.*
- *Eg: After the Sino-Japanese normalization treaty (Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People's republic of China) was concluded in 1978, the bilateral relations experienced relative stability Japan PM Ohira visited Beijing in 1979 to set the stage for closer economic ties in the 1980s by promising China the first yen-based loan of 50billion yen and cooperation in Deng Xiaoping's Modernization policies of China.*

However:

3) Negative by 1970s in terms of..... **TRADE DEFICIT (Tensions & Cracks in Public)**

- *Eg: 1971 Nixon Shock that saw the US abandon the gold standard and allow the cost of the US dollar to fluctuate, it saw the value of the Japanese currency (Yen) rise sharply and made Japan's exports considerably more expensive.*
- *Eg: In the 1970s, Japan's trade balance with the US shifted towards Japanese imports flooding the US market that overwhelmed the amount of US exports to Japan. For example, 27 US firms produced TVs at US factories in 1955 but by the 1980s, only one (Zenith) remained as they lost out to Japanese competitors! By the mid 1980s, Japanese exports to the US were valued at more than double the amount of US exports to Japan, and annual US trade deficits with Japan stood at roughly US\$50 billion dollars!*
- *Japan increased its share of the costs to station US troops in Japan: \$711M or 24% (1981) to \$1.7B, 31% (1987). Japan made steady progress in strengthening its defense capabilities from 1985 to 1989, after significantly underfunding its defense program prior.*
- *Eg: To contain Japan's trade surpluses with the US, the US forced Japan through various acrimonious negotiations to 'voluntarily' limit their sales to the US, most notably in textiles (1972), steel (1969, 1978), color TVs (1977) and automobiles (1981 – 1993). In 1988, the US Congress even passed a trade bill ('Super 301') clause that granted the US government the power to unilaterally decide that the domestic markets of Japan or other countries were unfairly closed to imports and to therefore unilaterally impose penalties on exporters of those countries in retaliation. This allowed the US to threaten Japan with sanctions from*

'Super 301' to enforce access to Japanese markets for US companies to export in supercomputers, satellites and wood products.

4) Negative in terms of..... BROUGHT TENSIONS BY BOTH THE JAPANESE PUBLIC & the US OVER SEEMING SUBORDINATION TO THE US, DEFENCE-COSTS SHARING & COOPERATION IN MILITARY TECHNOLOGY PUBLICLY

- Despite having caught up economically with the advanced nations by the 1970s, many Japanese were still not satisfied as Japan remained dependent on the US for its security. This dependence, together with a heavy reliance on the US market to absorb nearly 40% of Japan's exports and subsequent earnings for Japan, made Japan constantly vulnerable to US pressure and highlight the unequal standing in the US-Japan relationship. Because the Japanese electorate was so deeply divided, the mainstream Yoshida-school conservatives avoiding outright confrontation between opposing views, focused on building a strong consensus behind economic growth and adopting the language of pacifism.
- This view of Japan as a pacifist nation, fervently held by the Progressives, was cynically used by the post-war conservative leadership to dampen domestic political confrontation and served to concentrate exclusively on the goals of economic nationalism. The strategy of adapting opportunistically to the structure of the Cold War system while exploiting the advantages of the free-trade order proved to be remarkably successful but was bought at a high price as it was demeaning to rely wholly on another nation for security and to have it prolonged indefinitely as it required suppression of national pride. (Eg: 1960 Anpo Protests)
- For other egs: refer to earlier qns' outline egs and notes on DEFENCE COSTS BURDEN SHARING & COOPERATION TENSIONS.

Conclusion

Summarize overall argument of the essay and COMPARE Significance of **GIVEN FACTOR vs COUNTER FACTORS'** effect/role/significance over TIME (change/continuity) & explain WHY so