

Section A

You **must** answer Question 1.

ASEAN AND THE CAMBODIAN CRISIS

- 1 Read the sources and answer the questions which follow.

Source A

After two days of discussions in Kuantan, Malaysian Prime Minister Hussein Onn and Indonesian President Suharto agreed on what was officially described as a principle to clear up the conflict.

The basic idea is simple: Vietnam should not continue to be under Soviet influence, nor should it fall into China's grip. Hanoi, the two leaders seem to be saying, would be welcome to deal with ASEAN once it is rid of superpower influence. And China's hawkish attitude towards the conflict was not welcomed.

The basic idea is deeply rooted in Malaysian foreign policy, harking back to the ZOPFAN Declaration of 1971. But the latest call was made bilaterally, whereas in 1971 all five foreign ministers of ASEAN signed the document. In 1971 there was no mention of any superpower by name, but in Kuantan on March 27, the Soviet Union and China were named, and the call to these countries to leave Vietnam alone was blunt. The Kuantan principle is patently an attempt to dramatise the 10-year-old call for a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality.

Before the principle was announced, the most important decision expected was on an early ASEAN summit, which both Singapore and the Philippines are known to favour. But Hussein dismissed the need for a summit, saying there was no emergency for it. Most observers interpreted the public dismissal as a deliberate signal to those in ASEAN who harbour hardline ideas of a joint effort to force Vietnam into withdrawing from Cambodia. A summit would inevitably raise angry voices about Vietnamese aggression.

From a Hong Kong-based academic journal, published in April 1980.

Source B

As the cracks and fissures in the communist landscape widened to gaping chasms and violent upheavals, differences developed among the ASEAN nations to their approaches to the new power balance.

Thailand, historically comfortable with its big neighbour, China, and historically in collision with Vietnam, forged quick ties with Peking. Bangkok has become increasingly close to Peking and estranged from Hanoi – especially after the invasion of Cambodia moved Hanoi's troops just across the Thai-Cambodia border. Malaysia and Indonesia, with economically powerful Chinese minorities susceptible to the siren song of Peking, tended to see China as the ultimate threat and Vietnam as a buffer state with potential for absorbing Chinese energies in the short run. Singapore is strongly anti-communist and opposed Vietnam strongly, largely out of concern about the spread of Soviet influence through the Hanoi connection. The Philippines, which renewed its US base arrangements and alliance, moved cautiously and closer to China as Washington-Peking relations warmed.

For all the divergent viewpoints and interests, the ASEAN partners have tended to hang together in moments of challenge, reasoning that otherwise they might hang separately. "Even for Malaysia and Indonesia, which are more concerned about China, Peking is a potential threat rather than an immediate threat," said Singapore's deputy prime minister and veteran chief diplomat, Sinnathamby Rajaratnam. "We may dream different nightmares about the future, but when the alarm goes off in the morning, we wake to deal with the problem at hand. And we are all strongly backing Thailand when it is confronted with the immediate threat," Rajaratnam said.

Extract from a Washington Post article, July 1980.

Source C

The Foreign Ministers reaffirmed that they continue to recognise the Government of Democratic Kampuchea and to extend their support of its representation at the United Nations. They were firmly of the view that there was no justification for attempts to overthrow the legitimate Government of Democratic Kampuchea by foreign military intervention. Such actions violate the internationally-recognised principles governing inter-state relations. They therefore called upon Member States of the United Nations to support the continued recognition and representation of the Government of Democratic Kampuchea at the United Nations.

The Foreign Ministers rejected the various arguments that are being advanced to justify the continued occupation of Kampuchea, and to accord recognition to the regime that has been established in Phnom Penh by Vietnamese forces. The Foreign Ministers reiterated their stand that no regime set up by occupying foreign forces, howsoever it is given the appearance of legitimacy, can satisfy the principles enunciated in the UN Charter. They stressed that the grounds for their support for the credentials of Democratic Kampuchea are based on the fundamental principle that foreign intervention must be opposed and that any change in the recognition of Democratic Kampuchea's credentials would be tantamount to condoning Vietnamese military intervention.

Joint Communiqué of the 13th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, June 1980.

Source D

The United States sees ASEAN's unity and decisiveness as an example to other free people. The ASEAN collective voice of responsible international behaviour has been amplified throughout the world, and I am here to listen to you. Support for and cooperation with ASEAN is a linchpin of American Pacific policy. Nowhere has your leadership been more inspiring than in moulding the world's response to the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. After the collapse of South Vietnam, ASEAN took a strong stand against Vietnamese expansionism.

When Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1978, you recognised the threat and reacted quickly. The strength of your commitment and the direction you've provided on this vital issue have been much admired by the United States. In 1981, ASEAN organised the International Conference on Kampuchea. We continue to support the settlement of the Cambodian situation agreed upon at the conference: the complete withdrawal of Vietnamese forces under international supervision; the restoration of Cambodian independence; a Cambodian government chosen in free elections under international auspices.

Address by US President Ronald Reagan to the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Bali, 1986.

Source E

Then came ASEAN's first big test. Even when ASEAN submitted a resolution to the United Nations calling on the Vietnamese to withdraw from Cambodia, the Vietnamese really thought that ASEAN would make a lot of noise and then we would accept the situation. However, ASEAN worked together and despite early bias in favour of Vietnam and the Russians in the United Nations, we were able to get majority support for our resolution against a Vietnam which for years had been an object of adulation in the Third World. Since 1979, the fact that ASEAN is able to mobilise more support in the United Nations against the combined lobbying of Vietnam and its communist allies is proof that ASEAN is not ineffectual. It is an ASEAN effort. We asked the Americans and our Western friends not to take the lead in this matter but to follow us.

Memoirs of Mr. S. Rajaratnam (Singapore's Foreign Minister 1965 – 1980), published in 1987.

Source F

Last summer's international conference on Cambodia began on a note of anxious hope, yet ended without breaking the 11-year-old stalemate in Indochina. As long as Hun Sen was viewed as an illegitimate of an occupying army, it was difficult for ASEAN to make any significant accommodation with Phnom Penh and Hanoi for fear of legitimising a precedent that allows neighbour states to invade each other at will.

Indonesia, as ASEAN's official spokesman had been advocating more openness and flexibility many years. Along with Malaysia, Indonesia is profoundly suspicious of China's long-term ambitions in Southeast Asia. Both see that a strong Vietnam can be either a vital ally against China or a serious danger if driven into China's arms. In 1987 Vietnam's Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach and Indonesia's then-Foreign Minister Mochtar posed a formula

to negotiate a Cambodia settlement; only to see it torpedoed by Thailand and Singapore. Within a year, however, Thailand's position had shifted, opening the way for the held summit in Jakarta in July 1988.

Academic article by an international policy journal, published in 1989.

Now answer the following questions:

- (a) Compare and contrast the evidence provided in Sources A and B regarding the ASEAN countries' attitudes towards China during the Cambodian Crisis. [10]
- (b) How far do Sources A–F support the view that ASEAN demonstrated unity as a regional organisation in responding to the Cambodian Crisis? [30]

Section B

You must answer **two** questions from this section.

You must support your answer with examples drawn from at least three countries in Southeast Asia.

EITHER

- 2 'Political instability in independent Southeast Asian states was due to the incompetence of government leaders.' How far do you agree with this view? [30]

OR

- 3 Assess the view that multiculturalism was more effective than assimilation in the creation of national unity in Southeast Asian states since independence. [30]

AND EITHER

- 4 'Agricultural policy is the key to economic prosperity.' How far do you agree with this verdict on the post-independence economic landscape in Southeast Asian states? [30]

OR

- 5 'Southeast Asian governments were incapable of dealing with the crisis.' How far do you agree with this assessment of the consequences of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis? [30]

End of Paper